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Chapter 1
Introduction
The process of economic globalization appears in the from of international
trade in goods and services, shorter-term capital movements among countries
and, more recently, a rapid increase in foreign direct investments (FDI). FDI
refer to long term cross-border investments with a substantial influence on
the part of the investing multinational enterprise.
Worldwide FDI inflows volumes increased from 13 billion US$ in 1970
up to 58 billion US$ in 1985. Again 15 years later, it received a more than
20 times higher level of about 1,300 billion US$ in 2000.1 This fact led to a
rising interest of economists in the causes and consequences of FDI for the
host economies and the countries of origin. In particular, the question raised
to what extend FDI could bring new technologies and know-how to local
firms in the host economy, and thus contributes to its economic development.
On the other hand, people and governments fear that jobs are leaving their
country in record numbers if local multinational enterprises invest abroad.
With the fall of the iron curtain during 1989/1990 Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEEC) started to transform their planned economies
into market economies. CEEC as well as the states of the former Soviet Union
1Source: UNCTAD [2004].
1
removed restrictions towards FDI at the beginning of the Nineties. Hence,
Western multinational enterprises received additional investment opportuni-
ties. As a consequence, the role of FDI in CEEC and the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) has grown dramatically over the course of the
1990s. FDI inflows increased from about 580 million US$ in 1990 to ap-
proximately 36,000 million US$ in 2002. After a sharp decline in 2003 by
about one third, they recovered in 2004 reaching the former level.2 Table 3.2
shows the development of FDI inflows by selected host countries in transition
compared to worldwide inflows for the period 1990-2003 and the cumulated
inflows over this period. During the last decade, all countries in transition
attracted a growing amount of FDI. Among these countries, 61% of FDI
inflows are observed into the EU-accession countries of 2004. In the early
stage of transformation, Hungary had been most successful in attracting FDI
receiving 54% of all inflows into transition countries.
2Sources: UNCTAD and EBRD estimates.
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3
A multinational enterprise has to make various decisions when undertak-
ing an FDI abroad. First it has to decide whether to invest at all. Second,
the question arises whether it should locate the entire production process
abroad. Alternatively the production process could be segmented interna-
tionally which means to produce intermediate goods and final goods in differ-
ent countries. These types of investments are called horizontal and vertical
FDI respectively.3 Furthermore, the investor has to decide how to enter the
foreign market: Should it built up an entirely new plant which means to un-
dertake a greenfield investment or buy an already existing firm. The latter
mode of entry can be realized via mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Table
3.1 gives an overview of the number of cross-border M&A-sales from 1990
to 2003. The worldwide amount of M&A-sales more than trebled during the
last decade. About 75% of all transactions during the whole period have
been undertaken in developed countries. A remarkably growing number of
transactions can be observed during the last decade in countries in transition.
Among these group, especially in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
the highest amount of cross-border M&A have been realized. Based on a
survey of 1050 investment projects, Marin et al. [2002] find that about 44%
of FDI flows were accounted for by M&A. The multinational enterprise fur-
ther has to decide whether to include a partner or not. Hence, the ownership
structure and the multinationals’ shares on equity has to be taken into ac-
count.4 Finally, the investor has to decide about the timing of foreign market
entry.
The economic environment has a substantial influence on all these deci-
3It not possible to make a clear cut differentiation between both types of FDI empiri-
cally. From a firm survey, Protsenko [2003] estimates that the share of vertical FDI ranges
between 50% to 70%, depending on the definition of vertical FDI. Marin et al. [2002] es-
timate that about 28% of Eastern European affiliates’ sales are delivered to their German
parents firms.
4Marin et al. [2002] report that about 55% of German FDI in CEEC and the CIS are
fully-owned affiliates.
4
sions. Especially in the beginning of the transition process in CEEC and the
CIS, multinational enterprises faced a number of potential sources of risks.
In case of foreign direct investment decisions these are typically country risks
such as an unstable legal environment, the protection of property rights, risks
concerning the profit transfer, exchange rate risks and an unstable macroe-
conomic environment, crime and corruption and so on.
The questions analyzed in this thesis are: does uncertainty or country
risk affect
• the investors’ decision about the mode of entry (greenfield investment
versus acquisition)?
• the decision when to enter a foreign market?
• the profits from horizontal and vertical FDI in different ways? As a
consequence, does uncertainty affect the decision between horizontal
and vertical production?
The empirical parts of the thesis confirm the theoretical results and sug-
gest that country risks really play an important role in all of these decisions.
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1.1 Definitions, Brief Literature Survey on
FDI and Contribution of the Thesis
The main difference between FDI and other capital flows like portfolio invest-
ments is, that FDI refers to an investment made to acquire ”lasting interest”
in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor. Further, the
investors purpose is to gain an effective voice in the management of the enter-
prise. Hence, the IMF suggests a threshold of 10 per cent of equity ownership
to qualify an investor as a foreign direct investor. The necessary existence of
a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and
a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise are the
main characteristics of FDI to differentiate them from portfolio investments.5
The Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) Paradigm (Buckley
and Casson [1976], Dunning [1977]) has been an early attempt to create
an overall framework to explain why multinational enterprises choose FDI
rather than serve foreign markets through alternative modes such as licensing
or exporting. The OLI Paradigm states that a firm must first have some
competitive advantage in its home market that can be transferred abroad if
the firm is to be successful in FDI. Second, the firm must be attracted by
specific characteristics in the foreign market that will allow it to exploit its
competitive advantage in that market. And finally, the firm will maintain its
competitive position by attempting to control the entire value chain in its
industry. This leads it to foreign direct investment rather than licensing or
outsourcing.6
Another strand of research explains the formation of multinational en-
terprises by differences in factor proportions between countries. Helpman
[1984] shows that firms internationally separate the production process from
5See IMF [1993].
6For an overview and a discussion of the OLI Paradigm, see Markusen [1995].
7
headquarters activity as they have different factor intensities. The low-skilled
intensive production should be located in the low skilled worker abundant
country in order to equalize factor prices between countries. Taking up this
idea, Helpman [1985] developed a model with multi-product firms and dif-
ferentiated final goods. As these goods are produced with different factor
intensities, factor-price-equalization allocates production of this varieties in
different countries. Altogether, these models explain the existence of ver-
tical FDI by differences between countries. Vertical FDI means that the
investor separates the production chain internationally.7 This view that FDI
is mainly motivated through differences between countries has been rejected
by Brainard [1993]. He shows that multinational activity is more likely the
more similar the home and the foreign markets are.8 One model explain-
ing FDI between similar countries has been developed by Markusen [1984].
He introduces firm-level scale economies as a driving force: Two-plant firms
have fixed costs that are less than double those of a single-plant firm, which
is the motive for multinational production. Here multinationals are defined
as firms that produce the same product in multiple plants, serving local mar-
kets by local production. Thus the model gives an explanation for the oc-
currence of horizontal FDI. These models have been extended by Horstmann
and Markusen [1987, 1992] and Brainard [1993].9 As a result, additionally
high transport costs and trade barriers make horizontal FDI more likely.
”Knowledge-Capital-Models” of the multinational enterprise combine both
horizontal and vertical motives for direct investment. Markusen et al. [1996]
and Markusen [1997] demonstrated how both types of firms can arise endoge-
nously due to the simultaneous existence of trade costs and different factor
intensities.
7Marin et al. [2002] report evidence for vertical FDI for German investors in CEEC.
8This explains the fact that the majority of FDI occurs between developed countries.
(See Table 3.2.)
9See Markusen [2001] for an overview.
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Apart from the issue of why FDI occurs, an important debate has risen
around its consequences on the host countries. In particular one subject of
interest in the literature is, whether FDI inflows affect productivity of host
firms and enhances economic growth in the host country. This might due
to the chance to adopt managerial and workers’ skills or due to technology
transfer. Given that firm-specific advantages exist, FDI speeds the interna-
tional diffusion of new technologies and other efficiency-enhancing intangible
assets like organizational skills. Borenzstein et al. [1998], Xu [2000] or for the
case of transition countries, Protsenko [2003] find a positive influence from
FDI. On the other hand, Djankov and Hoeckman [2000], Konings [2001] and
Damijan et al. [2001] find negative spillover effects on the productivity of
domestic firms in CEE counties.
The decision about the entry mode of multinational enterprises into a
foreign country has been analyzed only in a few theoretical studies. In prin-
ciple the foreign investor has the option to acquire an existing company (or
shares) in the host country or to set up an entirely new plant, which is re-
ferred to be a greenfield investment. Buckely and Casson [1998], Görg [2000]
and Müller [2002] find that the competition intensity in the foreign market
determine the decision between greenfield investment and acquisition. Fur-
thermore, the technological intensity and the technological gap between the
investor and the affiliate play an important role. Empirical studies of the
entry mode choice focus on factors like the investors degree of diversifica-
tion, advertising intensity, the relative size of the subsidiary to that of the
investor, the growth of demand in the target market and others (e.g. Hen-
nart and Park [1993]). Also the investors technological level is an important
determinant on the entry choice. Various studies suggest that high R&D
expenditures increase the probability for greenfield investment (e.g. Hennart
and Park [1993], Andersson and Svensson [1994], Meyer [1998], Brouthers
and Brouthers [2000], Harzing [2002]).
9
In contrast to the decision about the entry mode, the empirical research
on the timing of entry into a foreign market has received relative small at-
tention. Theories suggest different factors being responsible for the timing of
FDI. Buckley and Casson [1981] show how the cost structure of alternative
market serving strategies, which are exporting or licensing on the one hand
and FDI on the other, influence the timing decision. According to Dixit and
Pindyck [1994] most investment projects share three important characteris-
tics: Irreversibility of the investment, uncertainty about the cash flows and
the possibility for the investor to delay the investment. By developing an
option model applied on real investments they find how uncertainty affects
the timing decision. Based on OLI advantages, Rivoli and Salorio [1996] find
other factors which make the delay of the FDI valuable. However, most em-
pirical literature analyzes the impact of uncertainty on aggregated domestic
investment (e.g. Aizenman and Marion [1993b], Brunetti and Weder [1998])
or on investment at the firm level.10 On the other hand, the timing of FDI
decisions at the firm level had also been considered empirically. However, for
instance Kogut and Chang [1996], Tan and Vertinsky [1996], Blandon [2001]
and Gaba et al. [2002] either do not analyze the impact of uncertainty on
the decision when to enter a foreign market or the studies are limited to one
host country only.
Most investment decisions, in particular FDI decisions are made in an
uncertain environment. Uncertainty in the case of cross-border investments
typically occurs in the form of country specific risk.
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the impact of country risk on various
FDI decisions. In the next chapter we will define various measures of country
risk and develop a measure for exchange rate risk for Central and Eastern
European Countries and the former Soviet Union. In Chapter 3 we raise the
question whether country risk has an influence on the decision how to enter a
10See Leahy and Whited [1996] for a survey.
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foreign market, via greenfield investment or via acquisition. A simple model
explains the driving forces presumed to be influential for this decision. In the
second part, an empirical analysis will be presented to test the implications
from the model.
Chapter 4 analyzes the timing decision of a foreign direct investment
into Central and Eastern European Countries and the former Soviet Union.
From a real options approach it will be derived that country risk decreases
the probability of investment at an early stage. A Cox proportional hazard
model with firm level data from FDI in transition countries is used in order
to test the predictions from the theoretical model.
Chapter 5 explores the impact of uncertainty and country risk on the
expected profits from horizontal and vertical investment separately. As a
result from the theory, uncertainty negatively affects expected profits of a
multinational enterprise engaged in a vertical FDI, whereas it potentially
increases profits associated with horizontal FDI. On the one hand, from an
ex-post point of view the empirical investigation supports this result. From
an ex-ante point of view, uncertainty should have an impact on the decision
of the multinational enterprise whether to realize a vertical or a horizontal
FDI.
1.2 The Database: Firm Survey of Austrian
and German FDI into Countries in Tran-
sition
The empirical parts of this thesis mainly base on firm survey data of German
and Austrian foreign direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe and
in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The survey was conducted by
the Chair of International Economics at the University of Munich and was
11
funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG), the Volkswagenstiftung
and the Austrian Nationalbank. The data we use contain 2,115 investment
projects of 688 German and Austrian firms in transition countries during the
period 1990 to 2001.11
The firm survey represents about 80% of total German investment projects
and includes nearly all Austrian investments in Eastern Europe during the
period 1990 to 2001. The survey was carried out during the period from
1998 to 2001 and all investors were queried only once so that no panel data
is available.
According to the criteria of the German Bundesbank, German firms had
been surveyed if they hold a minimum of 20% of shares in a foreign company
and if the investment volume is at least one million DEM.12 According to
the criteria of the Austrian Nationalbank, Austrian firms must hold at least
10% of shares and the investment volume must be at least 1 Mio. ATS.13
In a first part, the data contain information about the parent company
such as balance sheet, number of employees and sales, organizational patterns
and others. The second part provides detailed information about the foreign
affiliate. Finally, data about the relationship to the parent firm and partners,
market environment and motivations had been conducted.
111,179 investments are from German multinational enterprises and 936 from Austrian.
The number of German and Austrian firms depends on the exactly definition of the investor
as some multinational enterprises have legal independent firms which have undertaken the
FDI.
12500 thousand DEM in case of service providers.
13500 thousand ATS in case of services.
12
Chapter 2
Measuring Country Risks
Numerous empirical and theoretical studies have highlighted the importance
of uncertainty for investment decisions. A new perspective of this issue had
been offered by real option theories. These theories point out that uncertainty
has a negative impact on investment decisions if the investment projects are
delayable and to some degree irreversible.1
Empirical investigations indeed have found a negative relationship be-
tween aggregated investment and various measures of uncertainty. Most stud-
ies find a negative impact of macroeconomic volatility on private investment.
These macroeconomic volatility measures are inflation and exchange rate
volatility (e.g. Serven and Solimano [1993], Aizenman and Marion [1995],
Darby et al. [1999]). Other studies focus on the impact of political uncer-
tainty on investment. Barro [1991] finds that government instability (the
number of revolutions) and political violence (the number of assassinations)
are significantly negatively correlated with investments. Similar results yield
Keefer and Knack (1995) accounting for uncertainties in property rights en-
forcement. Lensink et al. [1999] construct various uncertainty measures with
respect to interest rates, inflation, taxes and others which negatively affect
1See Pindyck [1991], Dixit and Pindyck [1994], and Trigeoris [1996].
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growth rates in a cross section of countries.
Less attention had been given to the role of uncertainty on foreign direct
investment decisions. Some studies focus on the entry decisions of foreign
firms under exchange rate uncertainty (for instance Campa [1993]) whereas
other consider composite country risk measures (Gaba et al. [2002], Wezel
[2004], Deutsche Bundesbank [2005]).
One important source of uncertainty which makes foreign direct invest-
ment different to local investments is the occurrence of country specific risks.
Country risks in case of foreign direct investments are the potential volatility
of foreign stocks, due to political or economic events in the country.2
The literature distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. Risk occurs
when the outcome is uncertain, but the probabilities of all outcomes are
known or estimable. Uncertainty on the other hand refers to a situation
where probabilities are unknown. In this sense, one aim of an investor is
to reduce uncertainty by learning about the risk concerning the profits or
the value of the firm, coming from the variability of the future state of the
economy. Therefore, country risk indices support the investor by reducing
uncertainty and detecting the variability potential of the profits and therefore
the value of the investment undertaken abroad. As a consequence, the value
of a FDI becomes less uncertain but remains risky.3
Country risk is separated into several categories such as (1) economic
risk, (2) transfer risk, (3) political risk, (4) sovereign risk and (5) exchange
rate risk. These categories overlap each other and maybe the one of them
might have an influence on another.4
Economic risk captures the potential for changes in the country’s com-
2See Gunter [1992] or Nordal [2002]. Calverly [1990] provides an overview.
3For practical purposes, in the following analysis risk and uncertainty are treated as
synonyms.
4Nordal [2001] distinguishes country risk in a similar way.
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parative advantage or in the government’s economic policy goals. Measures
are institutions like the degree of regulation or property rights, tax policy,
government expenditures or inflation. Transfer risk arises from foreign gov-
ernment’s restrictions on capital movements and may be a political response
to a permanent growing current account deficit. It can be measured as trends
in the external financing gap or debt over GDP ratios. Political risk covers
cultural and ethnic risk, socio-economic risk or changes in political institu-
tions. Consequently, typical measures are the type of the political structure,
the ethnic structure or the incidence of violence. Sovereign risk comes from
the government’s inability or unwillingness to fulfill its loan obligations. Be-
side problems of the distinction between the motivations of the government,
it does not affect the investment decision of a multinational in a high extent.
Exchange rates affect the profits of a foreign affiliate via international trade
contracts and of the multinational enterprise when transferring the profits
of the FDI. Exchange rates volatility often detects unstable macroeconomic
policies since they may arise from varying interest rates, inflation rates or
business cycles.
A risk affecting the decisions of a multinational enterprise which invests
abroad is different to one that is related to an international portfolio invest-
ment or to a lender to a foreign government. The very long time horizon
of the direct investment and its specific operational characteristics must be
taken into account. For this reason, sovereign risk seems to be less important.
Transfer risk remains difficult to quantify and it plays probably not a major
role for FDI compared to other types of investment: Beside potential profit
transfers, in the short run the aim of the multinational will not be bringing
back the complete invested assets. It is also difficult to measure political risk
and it remains not clear how profits and therefore the investor’s decision are
affected.
Within the firm survey of the Chair of International Economics at the
15
Table 2.1: Rating of Sources of Risk
Profit transfer 3.85
Failure of the banking sector 3.83
Expropriation 4.26
Exchange rate risk 2.95
Change in tax and customs policy 2.97
Insecure property rights 3.68
Unstable macroeconomic environment 3.00
Political turnaround 3.38
Corruption 3.18
Crime and mafia 3.86
Source: Firm Survey, Chair for International Economics, University of Munich
(from 1 - most important to 5 - not important at all)
University of Munich, 688 multinational enterprises which had undertaken
2,115 investments in countries in transition were asked to rate different
sources of risks in the host country from 1 ”most important” to 5 ”not im-
portant at all”. As a result from the survey, Table 2.1 suggests that exchange
rate risks seem to be the most important source of risk, followed by economic
risks such as a change in tax and customs policy and unstable macroeconomic
environment. Expropriation risks which are sometimes also subsumed with
sovereign risks are not considered to be relevant.5
In the following sections we will discuss some measures of country risk
from the literature and from organizations and compare the resulting data
for the case of Central and Eastern European Countries and countries from
the Commonwealth of Independent States.
5Unfortunately the risk ratings from the firm survey rather reflect subjective evaluations
from the investor than being a objective database for the occurence of risk. Nevertheless,
the responds offer some insights concerning the relevance of different sources of risks.
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2.1 Economic risks
Economic risks are estimated for example by indices provided by the EBRD.6
These indices cover liberalization, privatization, infrastructure and others.
According to this classification, Table 2.4 gives some indices covering
economic risk for CEEC and countries of the CIS. The indices range from
from 1: ”little progress” up to 4: ”typical for advanced industrialized coun-
tries”. All reported countries performed towards more economic liberaliza-
tion in respect of each index considered. As expected, the countries joining
the European Union since May 2004 made higher efforts to liberalize markets
than the other CEEC, which are basically Southern and Eastern European
Countries. These in turn achieve slightly higher values indicating more lib-
eralization than the CIS.
The question occurs whether economic liberalization is a substantial
source of risk for a multinational enterprise. Country risks which are of
particular importance to a multinational enterprise affect the profits or the
value of a foreign affiliate. Also the host country’s competition policy might
be not the best indicator for changes in government’s economic policy goals
or for changes in the country’s comparative advantage. On the other hand,
the EBRD’s ”Rating of legal effectiveness” could adequately measure the
protection of property rights as an intangible asset and therefore captures
the risk of the value of a foreign affiliate. Unfortunately, there is no data for
this index available until 1996.
6See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report,several
issues.
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2.2 Exchange Rate Volatility
Exchange rate volatility is a common measure in order to capture exchange
rate risks as a kind of country risk. Different measures have been used in
the literature in order to quantify the uncertainty about underlying variables
like interest rates, inflation, exchange rates and others. This measures in-
clude the normal statistical variance, the variance of the unpredicted part
of a stochastic process, the conditional variance estimated from the general
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model and the variance
estimated from an geometric Brownian motion.7 Authors who calculated the
standard deviations of the exchange rate (Kenen and Rodrik [1986]) have
been criticized because this procedure does not take into account expecta-
tions of future exchange rates. Hence, an appropriate exchange rate risk mea-
sure should capture the unexpected deviations of the current spot exchange
rate from its expected value - the past forward exchange rate. Therefore,
fluctuations in exchange rates should not be considered as a risk as long as
they can be anticipated by the market participants. Unfortunately, such an
index of exchange rate volatility cannot be constructed in the case of CEEC
because forward markets do not exist in each country over the period of in-
terest. Also Goldberg [1993] analyzed the impact of exchange rate volatility
on investments in the US. Darby et al. [1999] calculate the deviation from
the trend in exchange rates. For instance, Lensink et al. [1999] calculate the
standard deviation of the unpredictable part (the residuals) of a stochastic
process of interest rates, inflation, exports and others. Taking up this idea,
we construct an index of exchange rate uncertainty as follows: First, we es-
timate the following second order autoregressive equation with a time trend
for each country j from monthly data taken from ”Datastream”
exrjt = a + b · trendj + c · exrjt−1 + d · exrjt−2 + εjt (2.1)
7See Lensink et al. [1999] for a discussion.
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where exrjt−x is the nominal exchange rate in country j at time (month) t−x
(x = 0, 1, 2), εjt is the error term of this regression equation and a, b, c, d are
coefficients to be estimated.
As a second step, the standard deviation of the monthly residuals is
calculated for each year and each country. In order to account for the level
of the exchange rate, the standard deviation is normalized by the mean ex-
change rate. This resulting risk index, the variation of errors one makes with
the model in equation (2.1), therefore is comparable between countries.
The data on exchange rates covers 21 Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEEC) as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS).8 The period is from 1990 up to 2002 if data is available. The residuals
for each country from forecasting the exchange rates using equation (2.1),
are plotted in Figure 2.1 in the Appendix.9 As a result, a yearly exchange
rate risk index had been constructed for each country. On the one hand
it directly measures the variability of exchange rates. On the other hand
also uncertain macroeconomic policy is captured: Unanticipated movements
in macroeconomic variables would lead to abrupt deviations of the actual
exchange rate from its predicted value coming from equation (2.1).
The development of the exchange rate risk index is reported in Table 2.3.
Within the group of accession countries in 2004, Lithuania turns out to have
the most predictable and thus less risky exchange rate. In contrast, Poland
bears the highest exchange rate uncertainty within this group, indicating that
exchange rates are less predictable. Within the other CEEC, Croatia and
Macedonia do not suffer from highly incalculable exchange rate movements.
8Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine
9Note that Figure 2.1 shows the progress of deviations between actual and predicted
exchange rates. Consequently one should not consider levels of the deviations but their
volatility and extreme amplitudes.
20
Within the CIS, for Azerbaijan the same is true, achieving levels of country
risk comparable with Lithuania. In the beginning Nineties, exchange rates
in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania exhibited a large unexpected volatility.
In Belarus exchange rate sharply depreciated in 2000 so that the exchange
rate uncertainty measure highly increased. The reason is that the National
Bank of Belarus accelerated the devaluation of the official exchange rate from
BRB 320/US$ at the beginning of the year up to 1,020 in mid-September.
The official exchange rate was then unified with the four main non-official
exchange markets and a crawling peg exchange rate system was introduced.
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2.3 Composite Country Risk Measures
The aim of composite country risk indices is to offer institutional and private
investors aggregated information regarding the level of uncertainty in host
economies. The use of sub-indices is a typical way of making a risk index.
Usually, these sub-indices measure economic, financial, and political risk.
This makes aggregated country risk comparable between different countries.
Several banks and private institutions like Standard and Poors, Moodys,
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) or magazines like the Euromoney regularly publish such indices.
Previous studies using the Euromoney country risk index have found
an significant impact on the location choice of multinational banks (Yamori
[1998], Wezel [2004], DeutscheBundesbank [2005]). It is a synthetic indicator
of investor perceptions that takes into account several categories of economic
and institutional performance. The index has the following composition:
25% political risk, 25% economic performance (GNP per capita etc.) 10%
debt indicators, 10% debt in default or rescheduled, 10% credit ratings, 5%
access to bank finance, 5% access to short-term finance, 5% access to capital
markets, 5% discount on forfeiting.10 Table 2.4 shows the development of the
Euromoney country risk index. On the average, the ten new EU-members
seem to be more stable than the other CEEC, which again outperform the
CIS.
10The index is published by Euromoney annually in in March and September.
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2.4 Comparison of Country Risk Indices
Table 2.5 compares the country risk indices discussed and shows their corre-
lation coefficients. All indices show expected correlations between each other.
The volatility of exchange rates exrunc is negatively correlated with all other
indices as it has low levels for low volatility and vice versa whereas the other
show low levels if risk or transition progress appears to be comparable with
developed countries.
The correlation between the Euromoney index (euromon) and the dif-
ferent transition progress indices from the EBRD is relatively high. This is
due to the composition of euromon. Also within the indices provided by the
EBRD there exist high and positive correlations which are nearly all signif-
icant at a 5 percent level. All those indices base on subjective ratings and
seem to measure similar effects covering the progress in transition.
We will use the country risk index from Euromoney and the exchange
rate uncertainty index exrunc for further analysis in the next chapters of the
thesis. The exchange rate uncertainty has the smallest correlation coefficients
to all other indices and therefore it seems to capture a different source of risk.
Furthermore, in contrast to the EBRD indeces, this index relies on hard facts
and not on subjective evaluations. Moreover according to the firm survey,
exchange rate risks have been seen to be most important to decision makers
in multinational enterprises. We will not use the EBRD indeces because
of two reasons. First, the question rises whether the progress in transition
towards market economy is a good measure for economic risks. Beside this,
as the correlation coefficients of the composite index euromoney and the
EBRD indeces are in between 50% and 70%, it makes less sence to rely on
both types of measures.
In order to make exrunc and euromoney directly comparable, the latter
25
will be transformed by 100 minus the index which ensures that high scores
indicate high levels of country risk.
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2.5 Appendix
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Figure 2.1: Residuals from Exchange Rates Forecasts
Commonwealth of Independent States
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Figure 2.1 (Continued): Residuals from Exchange Rates Forecasts
Central and Eastern European Countries (1)
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Figure 2.1 (Continued): Residuals from Exchange Rates Forecasts
Central and Eastern European Countries (2)
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Chapter 3
Country Risk and the Decision
between Greenfield Investment
and Acquisition
3.1 Introduction
A multinational enterprise (MNE) has to make a decision between two types
of market entry when investing abroad: The MNE can either acquire (or
merge with) an already existing firm in the host country or invest greenfield,
i.e. set up a new plant in the host country.
Within the literature less attention was attracted to the impact of un-
certainty and country risks on the entry mode decision. Caves [1982] points
out that takeovers are less risky than greenfield investments, indeed they
yield a lower expected rate of return. In contrast, Anderson and Gatignon
[1986] analyze the degree of control an entrant will demand in the presence of
uncertainty. They state that investors will prefer a higher degree of control
within an uncertain environment. On the other hand, the decision about
an entry via greenfield investment or acquisition could also be driven by the
level of uncertainty in the host economy. This might be plausible if the entry
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Table 3.1: Shares of Greenfield Investments across Country Groups
Share of
Greenfield
Investments Observations
New EU Members 62% 1540
Other CEEC 71% 314
CIS 71% 246
Total 64% 2,100
Source: Firm Survey, Chair for International Economics, University of Munich
mode enables the MNE to bear higher risks. If the MNE acquires an already
existing firm abroad there is the chance to take over its ability to handle
these risks. This would imply that multinational enterprises have a greater
propensity to acquire an existing firm when external risks achieve a higher
level.
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of greenfield investments and acquisi-
tions into Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS). The new members of the European
Union are showing a slightly lower share of greenfield investments than in
all other countries in transition, although. Assuming that the new members
exhibit lower uncertainty for investors1, one would expect a higher share of
greenfield investments. The reason for this figure might be due to an enforced
privatization process during the early and the mid Nineties within this group,
and therefore a large number of acquisitions.
Other empirical studies of the entry mode choice focus on factors like
the investor’s degree of diversification, advertising intensity, the relative size
of the subsidiary to that of the investor, the growth of demand in the target
1These countries have to ensure unhindered capital flows and trade to the European
union as well as the effective protection of property rights.
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market and others (e.g. Hennart and Park [1993]).
In general, only a few authors addressed a theoretical approach con-
cerning the choice of a firm between greenfield investment and acquisition
when entering a foreign market. Buckley and Casson [1998] present a fully
integrated analysis of the foreign market entry decision, ownership structures
and options based on subcontracting and franchising. Comparing the costs
of a variety of alternative strategies they are able to determine the optimal
mode of entry. One of their results is that a highly specific type of the
entrant’s technology discourages entry by acquisition and favours greenfield
investment. This is because of technological adaptation and restructuring
costs which can be prohibitively high in the case of an acquisition, while
they will not occur in the case of a greenfield investment.
The importance of adaptation costs is also emphasized by Görg [2000].
He shows within an asymmetric duopoly model, that a new entrant will be
better off by acquiring an existing firm as long as these costs are not too high.
Müller [2002] determines the acquisition price and the profits under both
entry modes endogenously and finds that the optimal entry mode depends
on the competition intensity in the market in a non-monotonic way.
Many empirical studies state that the investor’s technological level is
an important determinant on the entry choice and suggest that high R&D
expenditures increase the probability for greenfield investment (e.g. Hennart
and Park [1993], Andersson and Svensson [1994], Meyer [1998], Brouthers
and Brouthers [2000], Harzing [2002]).
Meyer [1998] refers to multinational enterprises (MNE) with specific
technological competences which will probably have large differences in pro-
duction technologies and production know-how compared to to existing firms
in an emerging market. If the MNE enters the market via greenfield invest-
ment it has the possibility to select the workers and the location which are
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Table 3.2: Shares of Greenfield Investments Into Several Industries
Share of
greenfield
Industry (ISIC Classification) Investments Observations
C - Mining and quarrying 33% 3
D - Manufacturing 53% 982
E - Electricity, gas and water supply 15% 54
F - Construction 64% 110
G - Wholesale and retail trade;
repair of goods 79% 300
H - Hotels and restaurants 89% 28
I - Transport, storage and communications 83% 124
J - Financial intermediation 79% 238
K - Real estate, renting and business
activities 89% 187
O - Other community, social and personal
service activities 50% 6
Total 65% 2,032
Source: Firm Survey, Chair for International Economics, University of Munich
most attractive. This option does not exist if it acquires a new firm and thus
problems might occur when skills and technology have to be transmitted
(Hennart and Park [1993]).
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of greenfield investments and acquisi-
tions of German and Austrian FDI into several industries. Investors engaged
in power supply and mining, which can be assumed to be less advanced in
technology, are more likely to enter via acquisition than via greenfield invest-
ment: Only 15% of investors coming from the power industry (electricity,
gas and water supply) set up an entirely new plant. On the other hand,
the manufacturing firms and even more striking, the construction industries,
which might use a more advanced technology, favor greenfield investments.
A overwhelming majority of firms which are engaged in other service sectors
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also enter via greenfield investment.
In this chapter we present a model where a MNE faces a decision of for-
eign market entry via acquisition or greenfield investment. The interaction
between uncertainty in the host market and the investor’s technological ad-
vantage offers an explanation why one entry mode is preferred to the other.
There is a trade-off between lower costs of uncertainty in the case of an acqui-
sition, on one hand, and additional costs of restructuring which are increasing
in the investor’s technological advantage when acquiring a local competitor,
on the other hand. As a result, for some combinations of uncertainty and
technological advantage no entry will occur, whereas for other combinations
the MNE will prefer one strategy to the other.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets up a simple
model to explain the decision if under uncertainty the investor should enter
the foreign market at all, and if so, which mode of entry should be cho-
sen. Section 3 analyzes the implications of the model empirically. Section 4
concludes.
36
3.2 Model
In this section, we construct a simple model to derive an econometric speci-
fication of the investor’s decision whether to enter the foreign market at all,
and if so, which mode of entry should be chosen.
The investor is confronted with an uncertain environment. In FDI de-
cisions uncertainty arises from country-specific risk. These can result from
economic risk due to the macroeconomic development of the country, com-
mercial risk which is related for example to fulfillment of contracts with other
companies or local partners, and political risks such as protection of property
rights, behavior of state-owned companies or laws concerning investments
(Nordal [2001]). Following the literature on FDI, the resulting uncertainty
causes executives to undervalue foreign investments (Root [1986]).
We assume that the value of an investment via acquisition Va is deter-
mined by its non-risk adjusted present value of future operating surpluses
V 0a . The value suffers from the total cost of uncertainty in host country j
which is calculated by the level of uncertainty uj and the marginal cost of
uncertainty c > 0. Furthermore restructuring costs α · τi decrease the value
of an acquisition. We assume that the technological difference and therefore
the costs of restructuring are increasing with the technological level τi, at
which investor i operates. This adaptation costs occur due to a technological
gap between the investor and the foreign affiliate: buying an existing firm
can result in a technological gap between the investor’s R&D ability and
that of the foreign firm. To be more precise, this gap might be due to the
organizational or technological skills of the employees in the investing firm
or due to superior technological assets like machines.
Thus the value of an acquisition can be calculated as
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Va = V
0
a − c · uj − α · τi (3.1)
The costs of restructuring are important especially in the CEEC. Many
former state-owned firms have an technological disadvantage against their
foreign competitors: Inefficient structures as well as low productivity are
often still the case. Therefore it is necessary for the investor to enhance the
ability of the foreign affiliate in order to extract benefits from the investment.
The costs of restructuring are substantial if the investor has to provide firm-
specific know how about products or about the production process. Therefore
firms with high R&D potential are more likely to enter a foreign market via
greenfield investment, where adaptation costs do not occur.
The value of a foreign affiliate which is established via greenfield invest-
ment is
Vg = V
0
g − (c + d) · uj (3.2)
where (c + d) > 0 are the marginal costs of uncertainty to a greenfield
investment. The difference between the marginal costs of uncertainty to
a greenfield investment and an acquisition is d > 0. Thus the marginal
cost of uncertainty to an acquisition is assumed to be lower than those to a
greenfield investment. Uncertainty is less harmful to an acquisition because
these already existing firms demonstrated that they were able to stand their
ground in the past despite of an uncertain environment. As a consequence
the employees know more about the nature of the uncertainty in the country
than the foreign investor and they know better how to handle the specific
uncertainty.
From here we can derive three fundamental conditions. First, building
up a new firm via greenfield investment will be observed only if its value is
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greater than zero, Vg > 0. The necessary condition from equation (3.2) for
setting up a greenfield investment is
uj <
V 0g
(c + d)
. (3.3)
Thus an investor will only undertake a greenfield investment if the costs
of uncertainty (c + d) is not too high. This upper level of uncertainty depends
on the non-risk adjusted present value of future surpluses and the marginal
cost of uncertainty to the new plant.
Second and similar, the condition for entry via acquisition is that the
value of the existing firm is positive: The foreign investor would decide to
buy an existing firm only if Va > 0 which is the case if in equation (3.1)
uj <
V 0a − α · τi
c
. (3.4)
The upper level of uncertainty indeed negatively depends on level of the
marginal costs of uncertainty, but additionally on the level of the investor’s
technology and thus the cost of restructuring.
As a first result, there exists an upper level of uncertainty for each mode
of entry which must not be exceed. Otherwise the respective mode of entry
will not be chosen.
Third, comparing both modes of entry, a greenfield investment will be
preferred to an acquisition if the value of the greenfield investment is greater
than that of an acquisition, so if and only if Vg > Va or
V 0g − (c + d) · uj > V 0a − c · uj − α · τi (3.5)
Solving for uj yields
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Modes of Entry
uj <
α · τi + V 0g − V 0a
d
(3.6)
From equation (3.6) it is obvious that the greenfield investor will accept
a certain level of uncertainty only if the non-risk-adjusted value of a greenfield
investment V 0g is sufficiently high and the difference of the marginal costs of
uncertainty relative to an acquisition is low. Additionally, a more superior
technology τi will give him an incentive for an entry via greenfield investment
since an acquisition would become more expensive due to higher restructuring
costs.
The three conditions from equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6) are presented
in Figure 3.1. Here we assume that V 0g > V
0
a . This might be acceptable
because the efficiency and profitability of a recently created firm may be
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higher than that of a former state-owned firm.2
In Figure 3.1 we plot combinations of levels of uncertainty in the host
country (uj) and levels of the technological advantage of the investor i (τi)
where either no investment will take place, greenfield investment or entry via
acquisition will be preferred.
As equation (3.3) shows, the upper level of uncertainty for a greenfield
investment taking place does not depend on the level of the investor’s tech-
nology. Therefore it spans a horizontal line in a diagram for combinations of
uncertainty and technology. Above this line no greenfield investment will be
observed.
The upper level of uncertainty in case of an acquisition depends neg-
atively on technology and leads to the decreasing line in the figure. From
equation (3.4) we can derive: If τi increases, adaptation costs increase and
entry via acquisition is only possible if uj decreases. Again, above this line
no acquisition is achievable.
From the last condition in equation (3.6) we know, that there exists an
upper level of uncertainty for each level of technology where the investor is
indifferent between both modes of entry. Below this line entry via greenfield
investment is preferred. In other words, given the technology of an investor,
levels of uncertainty below the curve characterize states where greenfield
investments will yield lower total costs and therefore a higher value of the
foreign affiliate.3
As a result from the three equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6), in the white
area no entry will occur. In the dark gray area greenfield investment will
2Relaxing this assumption would not yield to different general results.
3The three curves do have to cross in one single point: While the horizontal line
indicates the level of uncertainty where the value of a greenfield investment is zero, the
decreasing line gives a value of zero for an acquisition. These curves cross at a point
where the investor is indifferent between both modes of entry. This is the case along the
increasing curve.
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maximize the firm’s value. Whereas in the bright gray area entry via acqui-
sition is favorable.
The results of the model can now be summarized. First, certain combi-
nations of uncertainty in the host country (uj) and technological advantage
of the investor i (τi) yield no entry. This will be the case if τi > τ
′
i and uj > u
′
j
in Figure 3.1. Under these circumstances the technological level and thus the
cost of restructuring the acquisition is too large, so that the advantage of an
acquisition with regard to uncertainty is exhausted. At the same time, for
uj > u
′
j we exceed the upper level of uncertainty so that no greenfield in-
vestment will be established. Second, for uj > u
′
j the investor will only enter
the market if τi < τ
′
i . In this case only acquisition is achievable. Finally, for
low levels of uncertainty ui < u
′
i an greenfield investment becomes more at-
tractive as the technological advantage rises: For higher technological levels
acquisitions become too expensive because of the costs of restructuring the
existing foreign firm and greenfield investments are more preferable even if
uncertainty rises (up to u′j).
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3.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section we empirically examine the impact of technology and, more
important, country risk on the foreign market entry decision between green-
field investment and acquisition.
3.3.1 Methodology
The greenfield vs. acquisition - decision could be estimated by an ordinary
binary choice model. But as our theory already suggests, we have to take into
account that there is also the possibility not to enter the market at all. As a
simple probit or logit estimation would therefore lead to a sample selection
bias, we have to test the entry mode decision under the condition that an
investment has been undertaken.
Hence, we use the Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) probit application
of the Heckman (1979) selection bias correction procedure. We estimate an
investment decision equation where a multinational enterprise i decides to
invest in country j
investij =
{
1 if invest∗ij > 0
0 otherwise
where invest∗ij = Xijγ + α1uj + α2τi + ε
1
ij.
(3.7)
Here investij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i invests in country
j which is the case if the latent variable invest∗ij > 0. The latent variable
invest∗ij depends on uncertainty uj and technology τi as our model predicts,
but also on additional variables Xij which earlier studies found to have an
43
impact on the investment decision. These will be discussed in the next sec-
tion.
Simultaneously, under the condition that an investment took place, we
estimate an entry mode decision
greenij =
{
1 if green∗ij > 0
0 otherwise
where green∗ij = Zijδ + β1uj + β2τi + ε
2
ij
(3.8)
where greenij is the dependent variable which is 1 if firm i enters country
j via greenfield investment. Again, this is the case if the underlying latent
variable green∗ij > 0, which also depends on uj and τi and a set of other
influences Zij detected in previous studies.
We observe that greenij is equal to one only if investij is equal to 1.
In these equations, α1, α2, β1, β2 are coefficients and γ, δ coefficient vectors
to be estimated. Within this simultaneous Maximum-Likelihood estimation
procedure, we can assume that the residuals from both equations, ε1ij and ε
2
ij,
are correlated.
ε1ij ∼ N(0, 1), ε2ij ∼ N(0, 1) and cov(ε1ij, ε2ij) = ρ
If ρ = 0, the model could be estimated using independent probit equa-
tions.
3.3.2 Hypotheses
The predictions we derived from our model can be summarized within the fol-
lowing hypotheses. The model explains under which circumstances a multi-
national enterprise will enter a foreign market and, given this decision which
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entry mode it will choose. We will refer to the entry mode decision equation
first.
We assumed that the value of an entirely new plant suffers more from
an uncertain environment than the value of an acquired affiliate. Local firms
may be more familiar with uncertainty in the host market. By undertaking
an acquisition the investor adopts the local management of the existing firm
which possesses information and knowledge about the local economy. These
skills might me more valuable the higher uncertainty in the host country and
therefore, buying an existing firm becomes more and entering via greenfield
investment becomes less likely.
HYPOTHESIS 1: The probability to enter a foreign market via green-
field investment depends negatively on the level of uncertainty in the foreign
market.
Furthermore, the value of an acquisition depends negatively on the tech-
nological advantage of the multinational enterprise. As analyzed in the pre-
vious section, an investor operating with a superior technology will be con-
fronted with high adaptation costs. The reason is that the MNE has to
restructure the foreign affiliate in order to assimilate the technological pro-
cesses and the skills of the employees. Markusen [1995], Hennart and Park
[1993] as well as Andersson and Svensson [1994] refer to this aspect.4
HYPOTHESIS 2: The probability to enter a foreign market via green-
field investment rises as the technological advantage of the multinational en-
terprise increases.
A number of empirical studies uncover a positive and significant impact
of the technological intensity on the likelihood of entering a foreign market via
4 Beside this argument, Brouthers and Brouthers [2000] mention the reduced chances
of dissemination of firm specific advantages to other local competitors in the case of a
greenfield investment.
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greenfield investment (e.g. Andersson and Svensson [1994], Harzing [2002]).5
Kogut and Singh [1988] and Chang and Rosenzweig [2001] find this impact
to be more fragile when choosing subsamples of their datasets.
The empirical literature on the entry mode decision detects other influ-
ential variables which are not considered in our model: The greater the new
plant compared to the investor the less likely a greenfield occurs. Relatively
small investors may be constrained in recruiting and training managers for
the foreign market. Therefore in this case management skills of the foreign
firm can be exploited by buying an existing firm.6
HYPOTHESIS 3: The greater the foreign firm compared to the investor,
the lower the likelihood for a greenfield investment.
Other characteristics have been found to be statistically influential on
the investors decision whether to enter a foreign market via greenfield invest-
ment or via acquisition. The probability for setting up a new firm is higher
in case of a fully owned affiliate (Hennart and Park [1993]) and lower for the
manufacturing sector (Kogut and Singh [1988]).
The non-risk adjusted value of future operating surpluses of the foreign
affiliate coming from our model should be also taken into account. Although
it directly affects the value of the project, its impact on the entry mode
decision remains unclear.
For the investment decision equation, the model suggests that the value
of the foreign affiliate becomes smaller if the technological level of the in-
vestor, i.e. the costs of restructuring, and the level of uncertainty in the host
country are very high. In this case no foreign direct investment is achievable
and the multinational enterprise will serve the foreign market via exporting,
5Although this result comes along with most of the empirical literature, Kogut and
Singh [1988] draw up the thesis that R&D-intensive investors might be more likely enter
via acquisition if they are investing for technology sourcing.
6See e.g. Hennart and Park [1993].
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licensing or franchising.
HYPOTHESIS 4: The higher the technological level of the multinational
enterprise and uncertainty in the host country the less the probability that
any foreign direct investment will occur.
The Ownership-Location-Internalization-Advantages Paradigm (Dunning
[1993]) detects three channels influencing the attractiveness of a FDI project
and therefore provides additional explanations for the decision to investment
abroad.
First, ownership advantages relate on the investors firm specific char-
acteristics i.e. specific competency of the firm to accomplish competition in
foreign markets. Such advantages may be intangible assets or may come from
the firm’s size. Since e.g. R&D expenditures increase intangible assets, they
therefore favor the decision to invest. This finding contradicts the Hypothesis
4 ; the impact of R&D remains ambiguous. On the other hand, greater firms
also should exhibit higher ownership advantages in the form of financial and
managerial resources.7 Hence,
HYPOTHESIS 5: The larger the size of the multinational enterprise the
higher the probability that it will undertake a FDI.
Secondly, location advantages focus on the question where to invest.
These cover conditions in the host country the investor is faced with e.g. the
cultural distance or the market potential. Lipsey [1999] finds that market
potential measured by GDP and GDP growth has a positive effect on the
investment decision.
HYPOTHESIS 6: The larger the market potential, the higher the prob-
ability for a FDI.
7See e.g. Blomström and Lipsey [1986]. For example, Choe [2000] shows that the
parent’s firm size has a positive effect on the size of of foreign affiliate.
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Li and Guisinger [1991] found that cultural distance has a significant
impact on the failure rate of foreign subsidiaries. Thus, we would expect
that cultural distance between the home and the host country has a negative
impact on FDI.
HYPOTHESIS 7: The larger the cultural distance, the lower the proba-
bility for a FDI.
Finally, internalization advantages refer to the ability of the multina-
tional enterprise to exploit the product or process internally by setting up
a foreign affiliate rather than licensing another firm. Dunning [1993] and
Chandprapalert [2000] treat country risk as a measure for internalization ad-
vantages since it can affect the investor’s ability to benefit from entering the
market via FDI instead of exporting or licensing.
3.3.3 Data
The data describing the multinational enterprises and the foreign affiliates
comes from the firm survey ”German and Austrian FDI in CEEC” - and
of course the CIS. 2,115 investments into 27 countries in transition coming
from 688 investors which had been collected.8 The entry mode decision of a
multinational enterprise is analyzed in two simultaneous steps: The investor’s
decision whether to invest at all and the entry mode decision itself.
For the investment decision we observe 688 investors who either invested
in one or more of the 27 countries or decided not to invest there. From
this point of view we observe 18,576 decisions from 688 investors times 27
countries, each with certain characteristics. Taking into account that some
investors decided to invest in a single country more often at different dates,
we reach 19,015 observations.
8See Section 1.2.
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On the other hand, without considering any missing values theoretically
2,115 observations for the entry mode equation are available.
According to equations (3.7) and (3.8), the following two binary model
equations will be estimated simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood:
investij = γ0 + α1uncertj + α2tecinti + γ1sizewi + γ2lgdpj
+ γ3gdpgrj + γ4ldistancj + ε
1
ij (3.9)
greenij = δ0 + β1uncertj + β2tecinti + δ1surplusi + δ2relsizei
+ δ3daughteri + ε
2
ij (3.10)
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variables are investij and greenij
which are equal to 1 if the multinational enterprise undertakes a FDI in
country j and sets up an entirely new plant respectively.
Uncertainty in the host country uncertj is measured by the exchange
rate uncertainty index exruncj - the coefficient of variations of the residuals
- and the country risk index from the Euromoney magazine, euromon.9 It
should be noted that exchange rate uncertainty has two opposite effects on
the investment decision: On the one hand, firms might be prevented from
exporting through volatile exchange rates and avoid these uncertainty by
serving the market via FDI. Exchange rate uncertainty therefore should fa-
vor FDI. On the other hand, what we will presume here is that exchange rate
volatility is an indicator for an uncertain economic environment which cap-
tures overall economic uncertainty. In this context, exchange rate volatility
should prevent investments abroad.
9See Chapter 2.
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The variable tecinti denotes the technological intensity of the investing
firm measured by its R&D expenditures relative to sales.
The size of the investor sizewi is the logarithm of its worldwide sales.
All variables are from the firm survey except country risk variables.
Additionally, country specific variables occur in the investment decision
equation. We capture location advantages for market searching FDI, by the
logarithm of GDP lgdpj (from Penn World Tables Version 6.1) and growth
of GDP gdpgrj (from EBRD).
10 The cultural distance (ldistancj) is the log-
arithm of the geographical distance between the capitals of the country of
origin and the host country (from route planner software ”Route 66”).11
The entry mode decision equation requires some other variables from
the firm survey. We approximate the non-risk adjusted value of the affiliate
by the variable surplusi which is sales minus labor costs over employees.
The relative size between the investor and the foreign affiliate relsizei is the
number of employees in the affiliate relative to the multinational enterprise.
The dummy variable daughteri indicates that the investor holds at least 95
percent of shares. Additionally we control for industry specific effects.
10Both variables are from the year the investment has been undertaken. In the case
where no investment occurs, the average over the period from 1990 up to 2001 has been
taken.
11The impact of the log of the geographical distance from the investor’s location to the
foreign firm is ambiguous: If the distance is a measure for transport costs, exporting to far
markets would be expensive and therefore investment would be more likely. But if distance
is a measure for cultural distance, the tastes are unknown, the legal system different and
investment should be less favored.
50
T
ab
le
3.
3:
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
an
d
D
at
a
S
ou
rc
es
V
ar
ia
b
le
N
am
e
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
S
ou
rc
e
g
re
en
ij
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
;
“e
n
tr
y
v
ia
gr
ee
n
fi
el
d
in
ve
st
m
en
t“
=
1
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
ey
in
v
es
t i
j
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
;
“i
n
ve
st
m
en
t
of
fi
rm
i
in
co
u
n
tr
y
j
to
ok
p
la
ce
“=
1
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
ey
ex
ru
n
c j
E
x
ch
an
ge
ra
te
s
-
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
D
at
as
tr
ea
m
eu
ro
m
on
j
In
d
ex
of
co
u
n
tr
y
ri
sk
s
(0
“l
ow
ri
sk
le
ve
l“
-
10
0
“h
ig
h
ri
sk
le
ve
l“
)
E
u
ro
m
on
ey
te
ci
n
t i
R
&
D
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
ov
er
sa
le
s
of
th
e
in
ve
st
or
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
ey
si
ze
w
i
L
og
ar
it
h
m
of
in
ve
st
or
’s
sa
le
s
w
or
ld
w
id
e
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
ey
lg
d
p j
L
og
ar
it
h
m
of
G
D
P
in
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
P
en
n
W
or
ld
T
ab
le
s
g
d
pg
r j
G
ro
w
th
of
G
D
P
in
h
os
t
co
u
n
tr
y
E
B
R
D
ld
is
ta
n
c i
j
L
og
ar
it
h
m
of
ge
og
ra
p
h
ic
al
d
is
ta
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
in
ve
st
or
an
d
fo
re
ig
n
affi
li
at
e
R
ou
te
r
S
of
tw
ar
e
su
rp
lu
s i
S
al
es
m
in
u
s
la
b
or
co
st
ov
er
em
p
lo
ye
es
of
th
e
F
D
I
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
ey
re
ls
iz
e i
N
u
m
b
er
of
em
p
lo
ye
es
of
fo
re
ig
n
affi
li
at
e
re
la
ti
ve
to
in
ve
st
or
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
ey
d
a
u
g
h
te
r i
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
;
“i
n
ve
st
or
ow
n
s
at
le
as
t
95
%
of
sh
ar
es
“
=
1
F
ir
m
S
u
rv
ey
N
ot
e:
T
he
su
bs
cr
ip
ts
i
de
no
te
th
e
in
ve
st
m
en
t
an
d
j
th
e
co
un
tr
y.
51
Table 3.4: Expected Signs of Coefficients
Expected sign for
Variable investij greenij
exruncj - -
euromonj + +
tecinti −a +b +
sizewi +
lgdpj +
gdpgrj +
ldistancj -
surplusi ?
relsizei -
daughteri +
Note: The subscripts i denote the investment and j the country.
In case (a) the cost of restructuring, and in case (b) ownership advantages matter.
Table 3.3 summarizes the descriptions and data sources of the variables.
Table 3.4 reports the predicted signs of the coefficients of the dependent
variables.12 As it can be seen in Table 3.4, the impact of the technological
advantage of the investor tecinti on his decision to invest in country j is
ambiguous: We derived from the model that the coefficient should be negative
for high levels of uncertainty. In this case it is more likely to enter the market
by buying an existing firm. The higher the technological advantage, the
higher the costs of restructuring the foreign plant. As a consequence, the
advantage of an acquisition vanishes and no investment will be undertaken.
On the other hand, we conclude from the OLI paradigm that ownership
advantages should be higher for technological intensive firms and therefore
entering the foreign market is more likely.
12Descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients of the independent variables are
given in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 in the Appendix.
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3.3.4 Empirical Results
The empirical results from the sample selection model are reported in Table
3.5. In the upper part it shows the bivariate probit estimates for the en-
try mode decision. Here the dependent variable is green. In the lower part
the sample selection equation with the dependent variable invest is given.
It takes into account whether the multinational enterprise invested in the
particular country. Table 3.5 includes euromon and exrunc as alternative
measures for country risk. After omitting the relevant missing values, the
sample size is 8,563 for the first investment decision estimation. From these,
743 investments actually have been undertaken, which is the number of ob-
servations for the entry mode estimation. The entry mode equation includes
dummy variables for industries.
In the last line of the table, a likelihood ratio test clearly rejects the hy-
pothesis that the correlation between the residuals in the entry mode and the
investment equation is 0. Therefore, the empirical methodological approach
to implement the bivariate probit model with sample selection is validated.
In the first specification in column (1) in Table 3.5 country risks are
captured by the index from the magazine Euromoney. Regarding to the
investment decision in the lower part of the first column, it turns out that
higher levels of uncertainty in the host economy decrease the probability
that multinational enterprises invest abroad. The estimated coefficient is
significant at high conventional levels.
The ratio of R&D over sales of the multinational enterprise tecint shows
no impact on the likelihood to undertake a FDI. This finding does not support
the result from the model that high technology and skill intensive produc-
tion processes increase the cost of reconstructing of the foreign affiliate and
investment becomes less likely. On the other hand, firms with high R&D
ratios might exhibit strong ownership advantages which enable them to in-
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vest abroad more easily. Maybe in the special case of Austrian and German
FDI into Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS the underlying story is
more complicated. As Marin [2004] shows, skilled labor is relatively scarce
in Germany and Austria, whereas Central and Eastern European countries
are relatively well endowed. The author shows, with data from the same firm
survey which is employed in this analysis, that German affiliates in CEEC
and the CIS on the average have about three times higher shares of well edu-
cated workers than their German parents. This outsourcing of skill intensive
activities indicate that Germany is poorly endowed with skills relative to
Eastern countries.13 Beside the pressure to reduce production costs, German
and Austrian multinational investors are forced to locate also R&D intensive
processes into these countries in order to elude this factor endowment scarcity
at home. Hence, R&D intensive multinationals could invest in order to hire
skilled employees. As the null hypothesis for the coefficient of tecint can not
be rejected in the selection equation, both opposite forces, high adaptation
costs on the one hand and skill endowment on the other hand, could play an
important role for the investment decision.
The positive and significant coefficient of sizew indicates that larger
investors are more likely to invest abroad than smaller ones. Moreover, as
expected, the size of the host market has a positive impact on the prob-
ability that a FDI occurs. Also the growth of the host economy shows a
significant positive impact on the investment decision. Both variables sup-
port the hypothesis that large and fast-growing economies attract market
searching FDI.
On the other hand, the larger the distance between the multinational
enterprise and the foreign market, measured by ldistanc, the lower the likeli-
hood that it will invest. This result indicates that the geographical distance
13A similar picture is true for Austrian affiliates.
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Table 3.5: Bivariate Probit Estimates with Sample Selection
(Industry dummies included)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
green
euromon -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
(-3.79) (-3.82)
exrunc -2.164 -1.986
(-1.34) (-1.25)
tecint -1.652 ** -0.776 -2.232 *** -1.239
(-2.31) (-1.12) (-2.70) (-1.55)
surplus 6.08E-07 *** 5.04E-07 *** 6.58E-07 *** 5.35E-07 ***
(2.95) (2.87) (2.69) (2.64)
relsize -5.71E-03 * -6.57E-03 *
(-1.76) (-1.76)
daughter 0.700 *** 0.819 ***
(6.77) (7.89)
Constant -0.082 0.280 -0.844 *** -0.445 ***
(-0.33) (1.23) (-6.28) (-3.52)
invest
euromon -0.033 *** -0.032 ***
(-12.48) (-12.42)
exrunc -4.483 *** -4.349 ***
(-7.28) (-7.16)
tecint 0.118 0.092 0.084 0.048
(0.33) (0.26) (0.24) (0.14)
sizew 0.095 *** 0.095 *** 0.086 *** 0.086 ***
(8.78) (8.83) (7.79) (7.84)
lgdp 0.062 *** 0.064 *** 0.121 *** 0.121 ***
(7.33) (7.59) (11.23) (11.34)
gdpgr 0.027 *** 0.024 *** 0.038 *** 0.034 ***
(4.48) (4.00) (5.88) (5.31)
ldistanc -0.429 *** -0.453 *** -0.742 *** -0.762 ***
(-9.01) (-9.57) (-20.36) (-21.05)
Constant -0.039 0.070 -0.936 ** -0.784 *
(-0.10) (0.18) (-2.14) (-1.80)
Obs. invest equ. 8,563 8,596 9,017 9,050
Obs. green equ. 743 776 738 771
Log likelih. -2,232.08 -2,340.05 -2,266.15 -2,373.57
LR test (ρ=0)a 22.46 *** 19.18 *** 21.95 *** 17.09 ***
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level.
Industry Dummies included but not reported. a χ2(1)
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is rather a measure for cultural distance than for transport costs.
Given that an investment took place, the upper part of Table 3.5 shows
the impact of the variables presumed to be influential on the entry mode
decision.
As the model predicts, high levels of country risks euromon significantly
lower the probability to enter the foreign market by setting up an entirely
new plant. In other words, economic uncertainty increases the affinity to
invest abroad via acquisition as the multinational enterprise gets the affiliates
knowledge and experience to handle specific uncertainty or local authorities.
The technological intensity tecint enters the entry mode equation neg-
atively which is a contradiction to the prediction derived from the model.14
One would expect that a multinational enterprise with R&D and skill inten-
sive production processes would avoid the resulting adaptation costs in the
case of an acquisition. Therefore, the probability for greenfield investment
should be higher and the sign of the coefficient should be positive. However,
earlier empirical studies find a robust and positive impact of the investor’s
R&D intensity on the probability to enter a foreign market via greenfield in-
vestment (Hennart and Park [1993], Andersson and Svensson [1994], Meyer
[1998], Brouthers and Brouthers [2000], Harzing [2002]). Again, the reason
for this result could be explained by the finding of Marin [2004]. If German
and Austrian multinationals are searching for well skilled workers in Eastern
Europe, taking over an existing firm abroad may be an easier channel to get
at skilled labor than setting up an entirely new plant and hiring new staff.
The coefficients of relsize and daughter exhibit a negative sign and a
positive sign respectively. Their impacts are significant and confirm earlier
results from the empirical literature. The control variable surplus enters
14Table 3.8 in the Appendix shows that this result does not change when excluding the
industry dummy variables. Measuring the technological intensity by the share of workers
employed in R&D shows no impact.
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positively and significantly.
The second estimation does not contain the variables relsize and daugh-
ter as they where not derived from the model discussed before. Only the
coefficient of tecint looses its explanatory power in the entry mode equation.
All other coefficients remain robust.
The third column in Table 3.5 contains the volatility of the exchange
rates exrunc as a measure for country risks. As expected, the level of coun-
try risk turns out to have a negative and significant impact on the investor’s
decision to invest in the particular country. Thus the data does not confirm
the argument that exchange rate volatility favours FDI in order to avoid these
uncertainty. For the entry mode decision, exrunc also affects the probability
to enter a foreign market via greenfield investment negatively. However, the
result is not significant at conventional levels. In the grand scheme of things,
all other coefficients do not change in general. Again, the results remain
robust when excluding relsize and daughter from the entry mode decision
(column (4)). Table 3.8 in the Appendix confirms these findings when exclud-
ing the industry dummy variables and including a dummy variable manufac
for the manufacturing sector instead.
The empirical investigation partly confirms the results from the model.
As predicted, high country risks prevent multinational enterprises from in-
vesting abroad and, given that an investment had been undertaken, entry
via greenfield investment becomes less likely. Surprisingly, the impact of the
R&D intensity of the investor on the probability of entry by setting up a new
firm is negative. All results remain robust for different specifications.
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3.4 Conclusions
This chapter offers a model which explains the decision of a multinational en-
terprise if and how to enter a foreign market in the presence of country risks.
The multinational investor has the choice between setting up an entirely new
plant or buying an existing one. Earlier studies on the entry mode decision
of foreign investors completely ignored the issue of uncertainty regarding the
host economy.
In the model it has been argued that there is a trade-off between higher
costs of uncertainty when undertaking a FDI via greenfield investment and
the costs of restructuring an existing firm abroad. As a result, high levels of
uncertainty and a large technological gap between the investor and the af-
filiate should discourage the multinational enterprise from investment. Once
the investor decided to undertake a FDI, high uncertainty should decrease
and high technological advantages should increase the probability to enter
the foreign market via greenfield investment.
The empirical analysis partly supports the predicted effects from the
model. Using data from Austrian and German FDI projects into the CEEC
and the CIS, a probit application of the Heckman selection model is applied.
This is necessary because we have to take into account that the model also
offers the possibility not to invest at all.
Empirically, the main results support the finding that uncertainty pre-
vents investors from market entry via greenfield investment and makes ac-
quisitions more likely. Surprisingly, the impact of the R&D intensity on the
likelihood for greenfield investment is negative. This result contradicts ear-
lier empirical findings and the prediction from the model we discussed. The
reason for this might be that Austrian and German multinationals with high
R&D intensive processes also invest in Central and Eastern European Coun-
58
tries and the Commonwealth of Independent States to overcome the shortfall
of skilled labor in Austria and Germany. If this is the case, acquiring an ex-
isting firm could be more favorable than setting up a new plant and hiring
new employees. This question has to be left for further research.
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3.5 Appendix
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Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max.
invest 13,057 0.11 0.31 0 1
green 1,401 0.64 0.48 0.00 1
euromon 10,692 61.22 12.84 37 79.01
exrunc 10,213 0.05 0.05 4.55E-3 0.17
tecint 13,057 0.03 0.06 0 0.58
surplus 918 208,250 482,054 -17,007 7,038,839
relsize 1,301 1.62 12.25 4.16E-5 290.9091
daughter 1,333 0.56 0.50 0 1
manufac 13,030 0.59 0.49 0 1
sizew 12,785 18.73 2.00 13.84 25.60
lgdp 11,559 26.90 2.75 21.72 33.21
gdpgr1 11,567 -2.69 3.45 -34.90 13.30
ldistanc 13,057 7.30 0.89 2.83 8.70
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Table 3.8: Bivariate Probit Estimates with Sample Selection
(No industry dummies included)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
green
euromon -0.028 *** -0.021 ***
(-4.83) (-3.16)
exrunc -2.096 0.062
(-1.32) (0.04)
tecint -0.494 -0.112 -0.844 -0.498
(-0.78) (-0.18) (-1.09) (-0.71)
surplus 6.41E-07 *** 8.76E-07 *** 7.26E-07 *** 9.44E-07 ***
(3.63) (5.02) (3.29) (4.80)
relsize -7.24E-03 ** -8.60E-03 **
(-2.15) (-2.14)
daughter 0.660 *** 0.812 ***
(6.94) (8.20)
manufac -0.553 *** -0.677 ***
(-6.17) (-6.72)
Constant 0.520 ** 0.384 * -0.252 * -0.170
(2.39) (1.77) (-1.71) (-1.39)
invest
euromon -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
(-12.62) (-12.44)
exrunc -4.517 *** -4.417 ***
(-7.35) (-7.28)
tecint 0.111 0.070 0.080 0.044
(0.31) (0.20) (0.22) (0.12)
sizew 0.098 *** 0.099 *** 0.088 *** 0.087 ***
(9.24) (9.05) (7.96) (7.86)
lgdp 0.062 *** 0.064 *** 0.122 *** 0.123 ***
(7.39) (7.55) (11.32) (11.50)
gdpgr 0.026 *** 0.026 *** 0.038 *** 0.035 ***
(4.41) (4.35) (5.90) (5.40)
ldistanc -0.419 *** -0.428 *** -0.740 *** -0.756 ***
(-8.84) (-8.77) (-20.31) (-20.77)
Constant -0.129 -0.113 -1.003 ** -0.884 **
(-0.34) (-0.29) (-2.30) (-2.02)
Obs. invest equ. 8,563 8,596 9,017 9,050
Obs. green equ. 743 776 738 771
Log likelih. -2,242.79 -2,393.52 -2,278.71 -2,425.48
LR test (ρ=0)a 29.14 *** 17.9 *** 24.55 *** 13.29 ***
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level.
Industry Dummies included but not reported. a χ2(1)
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Chapter 4
Country Risk and the Timing
of First Entry into Foreign
Markets
4.1 Introduction and Related Literature
The political and economic change in Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries (CEEC) as well as in the former Soviet Union during the beginning of
the Nineties opened opportunities for multinational enterprises to serve addi-
tional markets. Although governments in CEEC and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) opened their economies for foreign investors about
the same time, Western multinational enterprises have chosen different dates
to invest in these emerging economies. The question discussed in this chap-
ter is the decision of a multinational enterprise when to invest abroad in an
uncertain environment or, in other words, the question of the timing of FDI
in consideration of uncertainty.
FDI inflows potentially play an important role for the process of indus-
trial modernization of transition economies and increasing competitiveness
due to organizational restructuring of host firms, workers training or technol-
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ogy transfer. The impact of FDI on the economic growth of the host countries
has been analyzed by a number of previous studies. As many of them find a
positive influence, early FDI inflows could speed up the transition process.1
A number of earlier studies already discussed the factors which might
influence the timing of investments abroad. Buckley and Casson [1981] pre-
sented a transaction costs based model pointing out the decision of firms
how to enter foreign markets. They argue that the optimal ”timing” of FDI
depends on the differences of the cost structure of alternative market serving
strategies, which are exporting and licensing on the one hand and market
development via direct investment on the other hand.
Rivoli and Salorio [1996] also analyze the optimal timing of FDI and
find Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) advantages (Dunning [1993])
to be determinants of the timing of market entry under uncertainty. When
uncertainty exists, the possibility of postponing the investment and waiting
for further information becomes highly valuable. They are treating ownership
advantages as source for a quasi-monopoly e.g. in the presence of existing
patents, which make investments more delayable. Therefore market entry
should be observed to occur later. Market entry could be done at once if
the investment is completely reversible. In this case the entire investment
expenditure can be regained by reselling the project. But this requires effec-
tive markets and a lot of alternative uses of the firm’s assets. In the case of
high internalization advantages such as tacit knowledge which is difficult to
codify and to transmit, high transaction costs are likely to occur. So higher
internalization advantages decrease the reversibility of the investment project
and therefore the value of waiting will be higher.
1See for example Borenzstein et al. [1998], Xu [2000] or Protsenko [2003]. On the
other hand, Djankov and Hoeckman [2000], Konings [2001] and Damijan et al. [2001]
find negative spillover effects on the productivity of domestic firms in CEE counties. This
result might due to the fact that this studies cover periods of a few years only.
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Another approach based on Myers [1977] regards the investment decision
as an American call option. The decision maker has the right though not
the obligation to undertake the investment at an exercise price which is the
sunken cost of investment. Standard textbook models state that one should
undertake an investment if the present value of future cash flows are equal to
the investment cost. The problem is that this rule ignores the possibility of
getting additional information about market conditions and future cash flows.
Therefore, the pure opportunity to invest can be seen as an American call
option which is valuable as long as this investment opportunity has not been
exercised. Undertaking the investment means exercising this option. A huge
amount of literature highlights the value of this opportunity and shows that it
is positively associated with uncertainty about future profits. Consequently,
a multinational enterprise which has to decide whether and when to invest
abroad within an uncertain environment would make a suboptimal entry
timing choice by applying the ordinary net present value rule.
McDonald and Siegel [1986] develop such a theoretical real option model
and show that the ordinary net present value rule no longer holds because of
uncertainty about the value of the investment and because of two crucial un-
derlying assumptions: First the expenditure is at least partially irreversible.
The second assumption is that the investment decision can be delayed, i.e.
the investor has the opportunity to wait for better information about the
profitability of the investment project. The alternative to this assumption
would be a now-or-never-decision which would be less realistic. They find
out that at a given point in time, for an investment to be made, its net
present value must be sufficiently larger than zero to cover the value to the
decision maker of delaying the decision and keeping the investment option
alive. This leads to a focus on the importance of the timing of investment
decisions, the role of uncertainty in influencing that timing, and hence on
the level of investment activity at a given point of time for a particular level
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of uncertainty prevailing among investors.
The option pricing approach has been applied by some empirical studies
of firms investment decisions such as Hurn and Wright [1994] who focus on
oil field operations in the North sea. They use a Cox proportional hazard
model to analyze the factors which affect the time that elapses between the
discovery of an oil field and its development. As a result they find that the
level of the oil price but not the standard deviation as an uncertainty measure
is important for the timing of the development.
The question about the timing of a FDI has also been analyzed in some
studies. Contrary to the present analysis, they either do not account for the
impact of uncertainty on the decision when to enter a market abroad or they
are limited to one or two host countries only.
Kogut and Chang [1996] examine the entry of Japanese electronic firms
into the US during the time interval from 1976 to 1989. They consider
those firms from the Tokyo Stock Exchange which had no affiliates until the
beginning of this period. As a result, they find out that an undervalued
dollar, the size of multinational enterprise and high R&D intensity makes
entry into the US earlier.
Very similar, Tan and Vertinsky [1996] analyze market entry of Japanese
electronics firms in the U.S. and Canada for both periods between 1966 and
1974 as well as 1975 and 1990 separately. Their findings concerning R&D
confirm those from Kogut and Chang [1996] only for the second period, but
they also do not consider any covariate which captures uncertainty.
Blandon [2001] looks at foreign bank entry into Spain from 1978 until
1992. He also does not include any uncertainty proximity and concludes that
banks with strongest OLI advantages were the first to enter Spain.
Gaba et al. [2002] analyze the timing of entry of U.S. firms in China
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between 1979 and 1996. Among other things, they find that high market
uncertainty is associated with late entry. Also firms with greater level of
internalization advantages will enter the Chinese market earlier.
The topic of this chapter is to detect the determinants of foreign direct
investment delays from Austrian and German multinational enterprises in
Central and Eastern European Countries and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. The contribution to the existing literature is twofold: The
first difference of the following analysis to most of the earlier empirical studies
about the decision of the timing of foreign direct investments is that we are
not looking at only one (Gaba et al. [2002], Kogut and Chang [1996], Blan-
don [2001]) or two (Tan and Vertinsky [1996]) host countries, but the large
region of Central and Eastern European Countries and the former Soviet
Union. This enables us to take into account differences in country-specific
characteristics. Secondly, the empirical studies on the timing of foreign di-
rect investments do either not account for uncertainty or for the degree of
irreversibility. Thus, this analysis extends these studies and catches up the
predictions of the real option models applied to foreign direct investment
decisions more exactly.
The remaining chapter is organized as follows: The next section discusses
the real option approach and derives the factors which affect the timing of a
FDI . Section 3 summarizes the hypotheses which will be tested and describes
the data and the estimation procedure. Thereafter the results are presented.
Finally section 4 concludes.
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4.2 Theoretical Background: The Real Op-
tion Approach
In this section we will develop a real options model in order to find the fac-
tors which influence the timing of a multinational firm’s entry into a foreign
market. Following McDonald and Siegel [1986] or Dixit and Pindyck [1994]
it will be shown how uncertainty - among other factors - affects the decision
of a multinational enterprise about the timing of undertaking an investment
abroad.
It is assumed that the FDI project has two important characteristics:
First, the expenditure is at least partially irreversible. This can be stated
to be typical for plants, specific investments in machines and R&D or when
markets of these assets are imperfect. In this case investment costs cannot
be fully recovered. The second assumption is that the investment decision
can be delayed, i.e. the investor has the opportunity of waiting for better
information concerning the value of the investment project. Alternatively,
one could assume that the investor is faced with a now-or-never-decision.
In this case there would exist no decision about the timing of starting the
investment project.
These assumptions make the investment decision of a multinational en-
terprise very similar to the decision of exercising a financial option: In our
case the firm has the right, though not the obligation to invest abroad at a
predetermined price which is the cost of the investment I. If the firm decides
to invest in return it receives an asset or more specifically a foreign affili-
ate with value V (t) which stochastically fluctuates over time. Additionally,
the affiliate generates some net operating income which is lost if the multi-
national enterprise does not invest and which therefore can be seen as the
opportunity cost of delaying the investment.
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Thus, in the terminology of option theory, the foreign direct investment
opportunity can be treated as an American call option.
4.2.1 The Model
Let V (t) be the present value of an affiliate located in a foreign country.
Due to country specific risk, assume that the value of this foreign direct
investment project V (t) follows a stochastic process which is assumed to be
a geometric Brownian motion with
dV = αV dt + σV dz. (4.1)
dz is an increment of a Wiener process such that:
dz = εt
√
dt (4.2)
where εt ∼ N(0, 1), E(εi, εj) = 0 ∀ i 6= j.
With this specification, the current value of the project is observable,
whereas the future values are lognormally distributed with a variance that
grows linearly in time. Here α is a drift parameter or the expected growth
rate of the value and σ is the standard deviation of dV (and of the growth
rate of V ) and measures the uncertainty about the value of the project.
Although the investor observes V changing over time as information arrives,
future values are always uncertain.2
Let I denote the sunk costs of investment into a foreign market. An
investor wants to set up a foreign affiliate at a point in time at which he will
maximize the expected present value of the investment. The value of the
option to invest is
F (V ) = max E[(VT − I)e−ρT ]. (4.3)
2See Pindyck [1991].
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VT is the present value of the foreign affiliate at the unknown future
time T the investment is undertaken and ρ is the discount rate. An impor-
tant assumption is that the discount rate ρ exceeds the drift parameter α
in equation (4.1). Otherwise delaying entry into a foreign market via FDI
would always outmatch the decision to invest. As a consequence no optimal
point in time for the investment would exist. The difference between the
discount rate ρ and the drift parameter α is δ = ρ− α. Hence, the total ex-
pected return of an investment is ρ = α + δ, that is the expected rate of the
investment project stock appreciation α plus the dividend rate on this stock
from net operating income δ. The latter is realized only if the investment
has been undertaken. Thus δ can also be interpreted as the opportunity cost
of delaying the investment project and waiting for further information.
Keeping the option to invest abroad yields no dividends, but the value
of the option may appreciate over time.
In order to maximize the present value of the option to invest abroad,
the multinational enterprise is to equate, in the continuation region (that
is, at the margin between holding and exercising the option), the value that
he would obtain by exercising the option given the discount rate ρ, to the
expected present value of the future capital gains obtained by holding the op-
tion.3 This fundamental condition for optimality is expressed by the Bellman
equation:
ρF =
E(dF )
dt
(4.4)
As F is a function of the stochastic variable V , the total differential of
the continuous time stochastic process dF can be calculated via Itos Lemma:
3In other words, holding this option and thus delaying the FDI is the optimal strategy
as long as the amount of return from exercising the option, which an investor would require
given the discount rate ρ, is less than the expected rate of return from holding the option.
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dF = F ′(V )dV +
1
2
F ′′(V )(dV )2 (4.5)
Substituting dV from (4.1) into (4.5) and taking expectations yields
E(dF ) = αV F ′(V )dt +
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V )dt.4 (4.6)
The modified Bellman equation where dV is a continuous stochastic
process can be obtained by substituting equation (4.6) into equation (4.4)
ρF = αV F ′(V ) +
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V ) (4.7)
This second order differential equation shows that the value of the option
F will respond to changes in the present value of the FDI, V , and in changes
of the volatility of its value, σ. Let V ∗ be the level of the net present value
where an investor is indifferent between investing and waiting. Thus for each
point in time t there will be a critical value V ∗(t), with waiting to invest is
the optimal strategy if Vt lies on the one side of V
∗(t), and undertaking the
FDI if on the other side. In order to determine the optimal point of time to
enter the foreign market the investor has to calculate the trigger value V ∗(t).
In the case of investment the payoff then is the expected present value of
revenue minus investment cost.
To obtain V ∗ equation (4.7) has to be solved given the following bound-
ary conditions:
F (0) = 0
F (V ∗) = V ∗ − I (4.8)
F ′(V ∗) = 1
4As the expectation of dz is zero, some terms disappear.
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Figure 4.1: Net Present Value and the Value of the Option to Invest
The first condition in (4.8) states that if the present value of the FDI
becomes zero than the value of the option to invest is zero. The second one
characterises the optimal value V ∗, where the value of the option to undertake
a FDI and thus the cost of giving up the option is equal to the net present
value and thus the gain of the investment. In other words, it is optimal
to invest if the present value of the project at least equals the investment
expenditure I plus the indirect opportunity costs of giving up the option
F (V ). The third condition is the ”smooth pasting” condition (Dixit, 1993)
which ensures that F (V ) is continuous around the optimal investment timing
point.
Figure 4.1 shows the development of the net present value V − I and
the value of the option to invest F (V ) which satisfies the conditions (4.8).
The investor will postpone the investment as long as the value of the option
is bigger than the net present value. This is the case for V < V ∗. Thus the
optimal trigger value V ∗ will be where the curve of F (V ) becomes tangential
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to and then follows the straight line V − I in Figure 4.1.
Obviously, V ∗ is greater than in the case of the net present value rule
where V = I, which is the crossing point of the V −I line with the horizontal
axis. The reason for this is that uncertainty about the future present value of
the project makes information valuable which arrives in course of time. Thus
although the net present value is zero the investor will wait for additional
information and will keep the option to invest alive, i.e. he postpones the
investment abroad.
In order to determine V ∗, the option value F (V ) must be calculated.
The solution for F (V ) that satisfies the boundary conditions (4.8) takes the
form
F (V ) = AV β (4.9)
where A and β are constant parameters.
The unknown values of V ∗, A and β given I, σ and α = ρ− δ can now
be derived.5 First, from equation (4.9) and from the second and the third
boundary condition in (4.8) the critical value V ∗ at which it is optimal to
invest can be calculated:
V ∗ =
β
β − 1
I (4.10)
The constant A in equation (4.9) is
A =
V ∗ − I
(V ∗)β
=
(β − 1)β−1
ββIβ−1
(4.11)
In order to examine the impact of uncertainty on the critical present
value V ∗ it is necessary to calculate β. By substituting equation (4.9) and
5See appendix, for more detailed derivations.
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its derivatives into equation (4.7) we derive the following quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ = 0. (4.12)
The solution for β is
β =
1
2
− (ρ− δ)
σ2
+ [(
(ρ− δ)
σ2
− 1
2
)2 +
2ρ
σ2
]1/2. (4.13)
Dixit and Pindyck [1994] (pp. pp. 142-143) show that β > 1.6 Hence,
β/(β − 1) > 1 in equation (4.10) and V ∗ > I: There is a wedge between the
optimal investment rule received with this analysis and the net present value
rule. McDonald and Siegel [1986] interpret the wedge F (V ) as the ”value
of waiting to invest”. This wedge and hence the critical value V ∗ hinges on
several factors which will be discussed in the following section.
4.2.2 Comparative Statics
Now we can carry out some comparative static analysis and explore how the
critical value V ∗ changes if exogenous parameters change like the uncertainty
of the value of the FDI project, σ, the dividend rate from net operating
income, δ, and the cost of investment, I.
• (∂V ∗)/(∂σ) > 0
Dixit and Pindyck [1994] (pp. 143-144) show analytically that (∂β)/(∂σ) <
0 and hence (∂V ∗)/(∂σ) > 0. The reason is that an increasing uncer-
tainty increases the value of the option and shifts the curve F (V ) in
Figure 4.1 upwards. This implies a higher critical value V ∗, that is, the
6Thus, only positive values for V ∗ in equation (4.10) are possible.
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multinational firm requires a higher return before she decides to invest
abroad.
• (∂V ∗)/(∂δ) < 0
An increase of the dividend rate from net operating income δ is equiva-
lent to an increase of the opportunity costs of delaying the investment.
As a result as the value of waiting to invest F (V ) diminishes which
leads to a lower critical value V ∗. The investment will occur earlier.
• (∂V ∗)/(∂I) > 0
It follows directly from equation (4.10) that the higher the investment
cost I, the higher the critical value of the investment project abroad
V ∗.7 As V follows the trend α, more time has to pass to reach the
higher level and the multinational enterprise will invest abroad later.
4.3 Empirical Analysis of the Decision about
the Timing of FDI
In order to examine, among other factors, the impact of uncertainty on the
decision about the timing of a FDI, we model the time which elapses until an
investor undertakes a FDI into a particular country in transition. In terms
of the real option approach in the previous section, we are searching for the
factors which influence the option value and thus the survival time of keeping
the option alive. Following the related empirical literature (for example, Hurn
and Wright [1994], Blandon [2001]), we utilize a Cox proportional hazard
model for the empirical analysis concerning this question.8
7The net present value rule would also require a higher V .
8See Cox [1972].
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The Cox proportional hazard model specifies the hazard function h(t)
to be
h(t) = h0e
Xβ (4.14)
where h(t) is the rate at which a multinational enterprise invests at time
t into a particular country given that it has not invested in t-1. Similarly,
h(t) can be interpreted as the rate at which the investor exercises the option
to invest. Further on, h0 is the baseline hazard function when all of the
covariates are set to zero and X is a set of country and firm characteristics
postulated to impact a multinationals decision when to invest.
The Cox model seems to be a proper model for a number of reasons.
First, it does not require any restrictions about the baseline hazard, such
as the Weibull or lognormal specification. This is reasonable for the aims
of the present analysis, as the main interest is not in the estimation of the
underlying baseline hazard but in the impact of country risk or uncertainty
and other factors on the foreign direct investment timing decision. As the
literature on survival analysis points out, it is favorable to refer to the semi-
parametric modelling approach of the Cox proportional hazard model if the
parametric form of the baseline hazard function h0 is not known for sure.
Secondly, Tan and Vertinsky [1996] refer to the fact that on the one hand
probit or logit models could also be alternative estimation strategies. These
consider the difference of influential forces between firms that have or have
not undertaken investments abroad at a given point in time. On the other
hand, the advantage of the Cox model is that it relates a firms decision to
the time span in which the FDI has or has not occurred.
In the following sections the results from the theoretical model will be
summarized in hypotheses, afterwards the data will be descripted and finally,
the findings from the empirical analysis will be presented.
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4.3.1 Hypotheses
The model and the comparative statics in the previous section show which
factors might influence a multinationals decision when to invest abroad.
These results will be extended by outcomes from the existing literature on
timing of FDI.
As a result from the real options approach, uncertainty or - in the case
of foreign direct investment projects - country risk makes the option to invest
more valuable. Therefore we can state the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: High country specific risk potential rises the critical
value for an investment V ∗ and entry into that country occurs later.
The second prediction from the model is that the dividend rate as the
opportunity costs of delaying the investment decreases the option value and
thus the required critical value V ∗.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The higher the expected profits from a foreign affiliate,
the earlier the multinational enterprise will undertake the investment abroad.
The expected dividend rate from a foreign direct investment might be
estimated by the profits which were actually realized. This would imply that
the multinational enterprise is able to forecast them well. Alternatively the
investor could estimate the profitability by the available macroeconomic data
such as the growth or the size of the economy.
Similar to the net present value approach the investment costs directly
influences the necessary level of V ∗.
HYPOTHESIS 3: The multinational will enter the foreign market later
if the sunken costs of investment are high.
Other influential variables have been explored empirically in the litera-
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ture or can be derived indirectly from the previous model. The distance to a
foreign location is usually considered in the OLI literature as an important
locational specific advantage.9 Typically monitoring costs are considered to
grow with distance which indeed become less important with new communi-
cation technologies. However, cultural differences may increase with distance
and therefore, the multinationals ability to fit with its potential customer
needs.
HYPOTHESIS 4: Geographically closer markets are expected to be en-
tered earlier.
The reversibility of a multinationals investment abroad should have a
strong impact on the timing of foreign direct investment. If the investment
would be completely reversible, there would be no reason to postpone an
investment with a positive net present value because the sunken costs of
investment could be fully recovered in case that the project fails. This ar-
gument might be true for tangible assets as these may be easier to resell
than intangible assets such as the firms knowledge stock in R&D or its brand
label.10
HYPOTHESIS 5: A high degree in intangible assets implies less re-
versibility of the investment and entry should be expected to occur later.
Additional factors which might influence the FDI decision come from
gravity models (Brenton et al., 1999). These state that FDI flows depend
positively on the size of the economy.
HYPOTHESIS 6: The larger the market of the host country the more
likely is that the FDI occurs at an early stage.
9See Blandon [2001].
10See Rivoli and Solario [1996].
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4.3.2 Data
Generally it is difficult to collect data on investment delay, which is the time
that elapses from the point in time when the investment opportunity occurs
until the realization of the project. However, the fall of the iron curtain dur-
ing 1989/1990 indicates a unique starting date for a sudden removal of restric-
tions towards FDI into Central and Eastern European Countries in transition
and the former Soviet Union.11 This pattern is confirmed by macroeconomic
data: FDI inflows in the Central and Eastern European Countries increased
from an average of 59 million US$ in the period 1985-1989, up to 300 US$
in 1990 and 2,448 US$ in 1991.12
Furthermore, the point in time from which on investments abroad are
possible, not only depends on the economic environment but also on specific
characteristics of the investor. Therefore, only those firms are considered
within the following analysis which at least have undertaken one investment
abroad.
The firm survey ”German and Austrian FDI in CEEC” of the Chair
of International Economics at the University of Munich produced 2,115 in-
vestments into 27 countries in transition from 688 investors. The survey was
carried out during the period from 1998 to 2001 and all investors were queried
only once so that no panel data is available.
In general, each of these 688 investors could invest in each of the 27
countries such that 18,576 (688 times 27) investment opportunities exist.
Each of these observations have country specific and investor specific charac-
teristics. As we are interested in the first entry of a multinational enterprise
in a particular country further investments into the same country are not
considered.
11Hungary was the only country where to some extent FDI inflows already existed before.
12See UNCTAD, World Investment Report, various years.
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In the case that an investor actually invested in a particular country,
the survival time of the option to invest abroad is the year of investment
minus 1990, the starting date of foreign direct investment opportunities into
countries in transition. These observations are treated to be uncensored. For
those cases where an investor did not exercised his option to invest into a
specific country until the year he had been surveyed, the survival time of the
option is set by the period from 1990 until the year he had been surveyed.
These cases are treated to be censored. Thus, a dummy variable has been
included which equals 1 for uncensored observations and zero for censored
observations.
Uncertainty or, in the case of foreign direct investments, country risk is
captured by two alternative measurements. The first one is exrunc which
is the yearly standard deviation of unpredicted exchange rate movements
in a country, divided through the mean of the exchange rate level in that
year.13 Hence, a high value of exrunc indicates an uncertain macroeconomic
environment.
Alternatively, we refer on a composite risk variable, the Euromoney
country risk index euromon which has been transformed such that values
between zero and 100 indicate an absolutely save environment and mostly
uncertain one respectively. The multinational should postpone the invest-
ment if risks are high.
Expected profits from a foreign affiliate are assumed to be higher, the
higher the economic performance in the relevant country measured by the
growth of GDP gdpgr (taken from EBRD Transition Report). A good market
performance should favor an early investment. ldistanc is the logarithm of
the geographical distance in kilometers between the multinational enterprise
and the foreign affiliate (source: Route planner software Route66). Invest-
13The exchange rate is forecasted by exrjt = a + btrendj + cexrjt−1 + dexrjt−2 + εjt.
See Chapter 2 for more details about both risk measures.
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ments to a place with greater distance should have been postponed.
In addition to uncertainty, a further assumption of real option models
is that the investment abroad is at least partially irreversible. Otherwise the
multinational enterprise could recover the complete sunken costs of invest-
ment if the foreign direct investment failed. The reversibility of an investment
is presumed to be lower when the investment project has a huge amount of
intangible assets such as tacit knowledge. We assume that the R&D intensity
of the multinational enterprise reflects these assets adequately. The variable
tecint are the investor’s R&D-expenses over sales, which is computed from
the firm survey and which we would expect to affect an early foreign market
entry negatively as high R&D reflects high irreversibility.
The size of the economy is captured by the logarithm of GDP lgdp
(source: Penn World Tables). To take into account the privatization progress
in countries in transition, we also control for the cumulated privatization
revenues as a percentage of GDP prj which is taken from several issues of
EBRD Transition Report.
Additionally, one could rely on investment specific variables which might
capture the influences on investment timing such as investment costs or the
future profits of the FDI project. To do this, it has to be assumed that
the investor knows these flows in advance. Those projects which had not
been realized actually could not be considered as we have no data on this
hypothetical investment opportunities. Our third hypothesis suggests late
investment if investment costs are high. Expected profits profit are approx-
imated by the logarithm of sales minus labor costs of the foreign affiliate.
This strategy will lead to a much smaller number of observations which all
represent a foreign direct investment project.
As some German and Austrian investors have more than one affiliate in
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the same country, we only consider the first entry into a country.14 Table 4.1
summarizes the definitions and sources of the variables and Table 4.2 shows
their expected impact on the investment timing.
The predictions from the real option based model and equation (4.14)
give the following estimation equation for the hazard of investing within a
certain period using data from host country (j) and the investor (m)
h(t) = h0e
X
X = β1RISKj + β2gdpgrj + β3tecintm + β4lgdpj
+ β5prj + β6ldistancim + ε
(4.15)
Here RISK are the alternative country risk indices exrunc and euromon.
The technological intensity tecint, the size of the country lgdp, the progress
of the privatization process in terms of revenues pr and the geographical
distance ldistanc are variables which could not be directly derived from the
model but which were found to play an potential role in the investment timing
decision.
As mentioned before, it is also possible to include investment specific
variables like the sunken costs of the investment lfdi and a more direct
approximation of the economic performance of the foreign affiliate profit
instead of the market growth gdpgr. We then estimate the following specifi-
cation
h(t) = h0e
Z
Z = β1RISKj + β2profiti + β3lfdii + β4tecintm
+ β5lgdpj + β6prj + β7ldistancim + ε
(4.16)
As in this case data is only available for investments that have been
undertaken, only these actual investments can be taken into account.
14The reason is that additional FDI projects could be treated as incremental investments
which are analyzed by Dixit and Pindyck [1994]. They analyze a firm choosing the time
path of its capital stock when investing into additional projects under uncertainty.
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Table 4.2: Expected Signs of Coefficients
Variable Expected sign
exruncj -
euromonj -
tecintm -
lgdpj +
gdpgrj +
ldistancim -
prj ?
profiti +
lfdii -
Note: The subscripts i denote the investment, m the multinational enterprise, j the
country and t the respective year.
4.3.3 Empirical Results
Before analyzing the decision of multinational enterprises when to enter the
countries in transition by applying the Cox proportional hazard model, we
will look at the Kaplan-Meier estimator that the investor’s option will survive
beyond a given point in time distinguishing between the new EU-Members
in 2004 and other Countries in transition.
The Kaplan-Meier estimator of surviving beyond time t is the product of
survival probabilities in t and the preceding periods S(t) = Πtj=t0(nj−dj)/nj.
Here nj represents the number of noncensored investment opportunities or
options that are still alive, and are not censored at the beginning of time
period t. ”Noncensored” means that only those FDI options are considered
which actually were realized until the end of the survey in 2001. dj is the
number of failures or - in this case - investments that occur to these obser-
vations during time period t. The plot of S(t) against t is the Kaplan-Meier
survival curve in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves for New EU-Members
and other Countries in Transition
As we can see, the probability of survival for the option is lower in the
case of multinationals which invest in the Central- and Eastern European
new members of the EU (which is the EUmember group among the dashed
line) than for investors into all other countries. In other words, at each point
in time foreign direct investments into the new EU members are more likely
than into non members. A log-rank test clearly rejects the hypothesis that
the survivor functions are the same for both groups with a significance level
of less than 0.01% (χ2(1)=41.48).
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the results from the Cox proportional haz-
ard model and give the estimated hazard rates for the independent variables
discussed before. A hazard rate smaller than one indicates that the under-
lying independent variable has a negative impact on the probability that a
multinational enterprise undertakes an investment abroad given that it did
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not invest into the country until that time. In more technical terms, in this
case the variable has a positive influence on the survival rate of the option
to invest and it is more likely that the investor will postpone the investment.
A hazard rate greater than one means that high values of the variable in
question favor early investment.
Taking into account that each multinational enterprise from the firm
survey could have invested in each CEEC and in each country of the CIS,
we obtain Table 4.3. Due to missing values, from 18,576 possible investment
opportunities only between 8,167 and 9,323 observations remain for the anal-
ysis. Many of these possible investments had not been undertaken until the
multinational enterprise had been surveyed.
The first column reports the results for exchange rate uncertainty exrunc
as a measure of country risk and the forecast of the profitability of the project
which is approximated by the market growth gdpgr. Both variables exhibit
the expected impact on the timing of a foreign direct investment at significant
levels: A highly uncertain environment makes late investment more likely,
whereas a good economic performance favors early investment. These results
remain robust for different specifications (columns (2) and (3)) and therefore
clearly support the first and the second hypothesis. The effect that a high
country risk lets multinational enterprises postpone investments abroad is
confirmed by Gaba et al. [2002]. In contrast to this study, they do not find
an impact of market growth.
The second specification contains additional variables which were not di-
rectly derived from the underlying model. Surprisingly, tecint as a measure
for irreversibility of the investment has a positive impact on the probability
for early investment. The hazard rate is not statistical at conventional sig-
nificance levels. This result does not change if industry dummy variables are
included (column (3)).
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The geographical distance ldistanc substantially decreases the propen-
sity for early investment: Austrian and German multinational enterprises
wait longer until they decide to invest in countries of the former Soviet Union
compared to investments in countries with a common border. This effect
might be driven by the lack of knowledge of the costumers tastes. Blandon
[2001] also obtains strong evidence that a large cultural distance makes early
investment into the Spanish banking sector less likely. Finally, the hazard
rate for lgdp points out that multinational enterprises invest earlier into big-
ger host markets, whereas the share of cumulated privatization revenues to
GDP pr as a proxy variable for the privatization progress shows a negative
and significant influence on the FDI timing decision.
Specification (3) shows that including dummy variables for industries of
the investor does not change the results and therefore confirms the robustness
of the analysis.
In columns (4) to (6) in Table 4.3 country risk is measured by the index
from the magazine Euromoney. It has been transformed such that low levels
indicate low risks and vice versa. The Cox proportional hazard models report
very similar results as in the first three specifications. Again, high levels of
country risk make early investment less likely. This result is again highly
significant. The hazard rate of the growth of GDP indeed becomes more
significant when further explanatory variables are included. As all other
results remain nearly unchanged, they seem to be stable and robust against
different specifications.
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Another possibility to explore the driving forces for the foreign direct
investment timing of multinational enterprises is to consider data from the
foreign affiliates. Since these data can only be observed after the investment
has been undertaken, we have to assume that the investor had appropriate
expectations concerning the unknown profits of the investment.
Therefore, only actual foreign direct investments can be taken into ac-
count which reduces the number of observations after considering missing
values to a total number of 461 to 666. Table 4.4 shows the results from the
Cox proportional hazard model for this strategy. Instead of approximating
the profitability of the foreign affiliate by the host market growth, we now
rely on a more direct measure profit, which is computed by data from the
investment projects. In contrast to the previous strategy, also the amount of
sunken investment costs lfdi can now be considered.
The first column of Table 4.4 displays the hazard rates for the influential
variables which have been derived from the real option approach, restricted
to the cases of actual investments during the regarded period from 1990 to
2001. Again, the significant hazard rate smaller than one shows that under
high country risk (measured by exchange rate uncertainty) it is less likely that
a multinational enterprise will give up its option to invest at a given point
in time. Therefore it will undertake the investment later. Also the other
two variables from the theoretic model have an influence on the investment
timing: Investments which are presumed being highly profitable (high values
of profit) will be realized more likely at an early stage of transition (with
a significance level of less than 1%). High investment costs lfdi show a
negative and significant impact.
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Column (2) shows the results when additional variables are included.
Here it is confirmed that low uncertainty and higher profits favor an early
investment abroad. The explanatory power of lfdi vanishes. Also profit
becomes less significant. In contrast to the previous results in Table 4.3
now those investors which possess a fair amount of intangible assets invest
abroad later. Assuming that the technological intensity tecint adequately
captures these assets, and assuming further on that investments undertaken
from these multinational enterprises are less reversible, the fifth hypothesis
is supported: Highly irreversible investments will occur later.
Country specific variables like GDP and privatization revenues pr still
explain the timing decision at significant levels. Indeed the distance between
investor and affiliate is no more significant. The reason for this might be due
to the fact that in contrast to the analysis before, here only actual investments
are considered. Thus with this reduced sample a selection bias occurs. On
the other hand, by reducing the data to actual investments only, we found
tecint to have a negative and partly significant impact on the investment
timing decision, now given that an investment has been undertaken at some
point in time. The main results are confirmed if industry dummy variables
are included (specification (3)).
An overall similar picture appears if instead of exrunc the alternative
country risk index euromon is included in specification (4). Again, multina-
tional enterprises seem to invest later in countries with a highly uncertain en-
vironment. FDI projects which are expected to be more profitable (indicated
by higher levels of profit) are realized earlier. Sunken costs of investment
lfdi turn out to have a negative and significant impact on early investment
abroad. This again supports the third hypothesis. Somewhat puzzling is the
positive impact of the distance between the investor and the foreign plant.
Given that a multinational enterprise had decided to invest in a country, the
hazard rate bigger than one indicates that the investment abroad will be
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sooner the larger the distance.15 This contradicts the finding from Figure
4.2. Most of the new EU members have a common border with Germany or
Austria. These countries have been entered earlier than all other transition
countries.
The technological intensity tecint has a negative, but less significant im-
pact on the timing of a foreign direct investment. Less reversible investments
indicated by high levels of technological intensity are less likely to occur at
an early stage. Given that an investment has been undertaken, the size of a
country has no influence on the timing decision.
Overall, the empirical analysis strongly supports the main results derived
from the real option model in the case of foreign direct investments in the
CEEC and the CIS. The timing of entry via FDI in countries in transition
depends on host country risk and the expected profitability of the foreign
affiliate. Furthermore, the sunken costs of investment and the degree of the
project’s irreversibility through tacit knowledge influence the multinational’s
decision when to invest abroad.
15One possible explanation for this result is that distance is also a measure for transport
costs in the case of exporting. The higher these costs the earlier entry will occur in order
to serve the market.
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4.4 Conclusion
The question about the timing of investments under uncertainty has been
analyzed theoretically and empirically by a number of earlier studies. Only
few of them focus on FDI as it is difficult to define a point in time from which
on investments into a certain economy or region is possible. With the fall
of the iron curtain 1989/1990 and the collapse of the communist command
economies additional investment opportunities for multinational enterprises
into a huge region emerged. This historical event offers the possibility to
apply theoretical considerations about the dates of undertaking investments
abroad empirically.
First of all, a theoretic model has been described which regards invest-
ment opportunities as a real option. As a result, a multinational enterprise
should postpone an investment abroad if the concerning country exhibits
high economic risks. The reason is that in this case the option to invest
becomes highly valuable and the investor desires a higher present value from
the FDI project. Also other factors like the profitability of the investment or
the degree of irreversibility of the investment should affect the date of start-
ing the project. The costs of delaying a FDI are high if the presumed profits
from the foreign investment are high. Hence in this case early market entry
should be observed. The FDI project should be postponed if high efforts due
to tacit knowledge cannot be fully recovered, that is if the FDI project is
partially irreversible.
These findings have been confirmed by the empirical analysis. First,
all possible investment opportunities of Austrian and German enterprises
into CEEC and the CIS from the underlying firm survey have been taken
into account. As a result, high country specific uncertainty decreases and
a solid economic performance increases the likelihood for early investment.
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Additionally, other covariates which could not be directly derived from the
theory have also a significant impact on the timing decision.
As a second step, only the realized investments abroad have been con-
sidered. This strategy allowed to include more direct measures like approxi-
mated profits or the sunken cost of the FDI project. Again, low uncertainty
and high expected profits explain an early foreign market entry. Addition-
ally, a high R&D-intensity as an approximation for the irreversibility of the
investment makes it more likely that the investment will be postponed.
As a political implication to promote early FDI inflows, a stable eco-
nomic environment and a policy that enhances economic growth has found
to be most important. Unfortunately, in contrast to other empirical studies,
this analysis is constraint to the last decade and it might be give new insights
if it could be applied to a longer period.
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4.5 Appendix
Deriving V ∗ and A in equations (4.10) and (4.11)
In general the solution for F (V ) from equation (4.7) given the boundary
conditions in equation (4.8) has the functional form
F (V ) = AV β (4.17)
The first and the second derivatives are
F ′(V ) = βAV β−1 F ′′(V ) = β(β − 1)AV β−2 (4.18)
From the third boundary condition of the equations (4.8) it follows that
F ′(V ∗) = βAV β−1 = 1 (4.19)
Inserting the second boundary condition this is equivalent with
β
V ∗ − I
V ∗
= 1 (4.20)
The solution for V ∗ is (4.10).
The second the boundary condition in equation (4.8) is
F (V ∗) = V ∗ − I = AV ∗β (4.21)
Solved for A and substituting V ∗ yields equation (4.11).
Deriving equation (4.12)
Substituting the derivatives of equation (4.9) into equation (4.7) yields
F =
α
ρ
V βAV β−1 +
1
2
σ2V 2
ρ
β(β − 1)AV β−2 = AV β−1 (4.22)
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which is equivalent with
F =
α
ρ
βAV β−1 +
1
2
σ2
ρ
β(β − 1)AV β−1 = AV β−1 (4.23)
By dividing through with AV β and subtracting ρ yields
αβ +
1
2
σ2β(β − 1)− ρ = 0 (4.24)
Deriving the solution for β
Substituting α = ρ− δ and rewriting equation (4.12) gives
1
2
σ2β2 − β[1
2
σ2 − (ρ− δ)]− ρ = 0 (4.25)
which has the following solutions
β1 =
1
2
− (ρ− δ)
σ2
+ [(
(ρ− δ)
σ2
− 1
2
)2 +
2ρ
σ2
]1/2 > 1 (4.26)
and
β2 =
1
2
− (ρ− δ)
σ2
− [((ρ− δ)
σ2
− 1
2
)2 +
2ρ
σ2
]1/2 < 0 (4.27)
Therefore the general solution of equation (4.9) is
F (V ) = A1V
β1 + A2V
β2 (4.28)
From the first boundary condition in (4.8) it follows that A2 = 0 and thus
β1 is the only solution.
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Chapter 5
The Impact of Country Risk on
Vertical and Horizontal FDI
In the previous chapters we focused on FDI decisions of multinational en-
terprises in the presence of country risks. Contrary to this, the aim of this
chapter is to analyze the impact of uncertainty and country risks on the ex-
pected profits of the foreign affiliate. More specifically, we will thereby distin-
guish between horizontal and vertical foreign direct investments. Horizontal
FDI means that the entire production process is located abroad, whereas
in the case of a vertical FDI the different stages of the production process
are internationally segmented. In this context we will investigate the ques-
tion whether demand and supply uncertainty in the host economy affects the
profits of both types of FDI in different ways. As this is actually the case,
we therefore expect that uncertainty has also an influence on the decision
between both production modes.
5.1 Introduction and Related Literature
The literature distinguishes between two types of foreign direct investments:
Vertical and horizontal FDI. A vertical FDI occurs if a multinational en-
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terprise geographically separates stages of the production process. Vertical
FDI are driven by differences in factor endowments and consequently by rela-
tive factor prices between countries (Helpman [1984], Helpman and Krugman
[1985], Markusen [1995], Hanson et al. [2003]). As a consequence, the foreign
affiliate on the one hand either receives a large proportion of the required
input factors from the multinational enterprise abroad. On the other hand,
the multinational enterprise receives a high share of the production from the
affiliate. It then uses these production as intermediate inputs for a final good.
This process induces a large amount of intra-firm trade.
Contrary to this, a horizontal FDI takes place if the multinational en-
terprise produces the same goods or services in multiple countries in order
to serve the local market. One driving force for this strategy was elaborated
by Markusen [1984] who points out the possibility that a multi-plant firm
might exhibit lower total fixed costs than a single-plant firm. Furthermore,
Brainard [1993] offers a model with firm-level economies of scale and trans-
portation costs: Low fixed costs or large economies of scale make horizontal
FDI projects more attractive in the presence of high trade costs. Additionally,
the host market size is expected to have a positive impact on horizontal FDI
because a larger market size offers greater opportunities to realize economies
of scale (Zhang [2000]).
Previous studies showed the importance of vertical FDI for instance on
the relative wages effects (Feenstra and Hanson [1997]) or on the productivity
of local firms (Protsenko [2003]). Only one study analyzes the impact of
uncertainty on different types of FDI. Aizenman and Marion [2004] show
within a theoretical model that higher volatility of supply shocks increases
the expected profits associated with horizontal FDI and reduces the expected
profits from vertical FDI. The main reason for this result is the assumption
that in the case of horizontal FDI, production is characterized by a higher
degree of substitutability between the parent firm and the foreign affiliate as
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both plants produce the same goods. In the case of vertical FDI, the parent
firm requires some certain amount of intermediate goods which are solely
produced by the foreign affiliate. A supply shock abroad therefore increases
the costs of production which now cannot be shifted between plants, and
profits decrease. They also show that sovereign risks should be more harmful
in the case of vertical FDI as the negotiation power between the multinational
and the foreign government is higher in case of a horizontal FDI. This result
is also driven by the possibility of substitution between the investor and its
affiliate in case of horizontal FDI. Additionally, both types of FDI suffer from
demand uncertainty.
The conclusion from this results could bear important policy implica-
tions. In the case of a high uncertain environment, profits would tend to
be lower for vertical FDI projects. This would deter multinational enter-
prises from undertaking vertical FDI. As Protsenko [2003] shows, vertical
FDI tend to exhibit positive productivity spillover effects on domestic firms.
In addition to other negative effects from uncertainty, these positive spillover
potentials would be lost.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the impact of uncertainty on vertical
and horizontal FDI separately. First, we will discuss a theoretical model
which bases on that from Aizenman and Marion [2004]. It suggests that
supply uncertainty is harmful for the profits of a multinational engaged in
a vertical FDI but potentially beneficial on the profits from horizontal FDI.
Demand uncertainty affects the expected profits always negatively. Using
German FDI data on the firm level, we will test these implications empirically.
Furthermore we use a bivariate probit model to explore empirically whether
one type is preferred to the other in the presence of different sources of
uncertainty.
One contribution of this analysis is the use of disaggregated firm-level
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data which enables us to find appropriate measures for the factors derived
from the model. Secondly, not only the effect on the profits can be explored,
but also the resulting implications for the decision of the multinational en-
terprise between vertical and horizontal FDI can be analyzed.
5.2 The Theoretical Framework
We consider two countries home and foreign, where ∗ denotes foreign vari-
ables. The households in both countries consume two final goods Y and Z
and obtain the utility according the identical utility function
U = Z +
A
δ
Y δ, 0 < δ < 1. (5.1)
The price of good Y is PY and the price of Z is normalized to one. Labor
supply is exogenously given by LS = L and LS∗ = L∗. Good Z is produced
in the home country according the production function Z = LZ and in the
foreign country according Z∗ = a∗L∗Z . As a
∗ is the labor productivity in the
foreign country, the equilibrium wage in the foreign country is w∗ = a∗ and
in the home country w = 1.
Two alternative production modes are possible for the Y -sector. A risk
neutral multinational monopolist has to decide whether the production pro-
cess should be fragmented geographically or whether the entire process should
be located in the home as well as in the foreign country. In order to focus on
the effect of uncertainty in the foreign country, we assume no transportation
costs.
In the first case of vertical production, final production in the home coun-
try uses an intermediate input M which is produced in the foreign country
corresponding to the technology
M = (1 + ε∗)b∗
√
L∗M , (5.2)
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where L∗M is labor employed in the intermediate sector in the foreign country,
b∗ is the labor productivity in this sector and ε∗ is a productivity shock in
the foreign country with E(ε∗) = 0 and which ranges in between ]− 1; 1[. As
a second stage, final production of Y v in the home country requires a certain
proportion of M and LY given the Leontief technology
Y v = min[M ; b
√
LY ].
1 (5.3)
The total set-up costs of both plants are Cv.
Alternatively, horizontal production of Y in the home and in the for-
eign country would also require two plants with total set-up costs Ch. The
production functions are
Y = a
√
LY ; Y
∗ = (1 + ε∗)a∗
√
L∗Y . (5.4)
Here a and a∗ are labor productivity in case of horizontal FDI in the home
and the foreign country respectively.
The production process in case of a vertical FDI according to equation
(5.2) and (5.3) implies a certain ratio of the input factors LY and M in the
final production of good Y . Hence, the ratio of labor employed in both plants
is
LY
L∗M
=
[b∗(1 + ε∗)]2
b2
. (5.5)
Horizontal production allows perfect substitutability between the plants in
the home and in the foreign country. The multinational enterprise will mini-
mize total labor costs for a given output by equalizing the marginal produc-
tion costs in both plants. The relative labor demand in this case therefore
is
LY
L∗Y
=
a2
[a∗(1 + ε∗)/w∗]2
.2 (5.6)
1Contrary to Aizenman and Marion [2004] we do not assume any shocks in the home
country as the main interest is the focus on foreign market conditions.
2See Appendix for a more detailed derivation.
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The comparison of equations (5.5) and (5.6) reveals that the impact of
a foreign productivity shock on relative employment is opposite for vertical
and horizontal FDI. From equation (5.1) the demand function for Y in the
home and in the foreign country is
Y d = [
A
PY
]η; η =
1
1− δ
> 1.3 (5.7)
Here, η is the demand elasticity. Total demand in both countries is 2Y d.
In the case of a vertical FDI, final goods Y are produced only in the home
country and then they are partly exported in order to serve the foreign mar-
ket. The expected profits are calculated by substituting LY and L
∗
M from
equations (5.2) and (5.3) into the monopolist profit function. This yields the
optimal output, and thus expected profits.
The expected profits in the case of vertical FDI are
E[Πv] = kvE[θv + θ
∗
v(1 + ε
∗)−2]−
η−1
η+1 − Cv, (5.8)
kv = (1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
] η−1
η+1
,
θv =
b−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
, θ∗v =
w∗b∗−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
.
If the multinational monopolist undertakes a horizontal FDI, Y is produced
in both plants such that marginal costs are equal. Consequently, also in
this case exports can occur as each plant does not produce exclusively for
its own market and no prohibitive transportation costs are assumed. Min-
imizing total costs for a given output by locating domestic labor and labor
employed abroad gives the optimal labor ratio in both plants. Hence, profit-
maximizing domestic labor can be calculated and a monopolists expected
3See Appendix.
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profits for horizontal production. This yields
E[Πh] = khE[θh + θ
∗
h(1 + ε
∗)2]
η−1
η+1 − Ch, (5.9)
kh = (1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1
,
θh =
a2w∗
a2w∗ + a∗2
, θ∗h =
a∗2
a2w∗ + a∗2
.
where θ(.) and θ
∗
(.) are constants determined by productivity and wages with
θ(.) + θ
∗
(.) = 1 and k(.) are gross profits in the absence of uncertainty.
4
Inspecting equations (5.8) and (5.9) reveals that expected profits are
increasing in productivity shocks5:
∂E(Πv)
∂ε∗
> 0
and
∂E(Πh)
∂ε∗
> 0.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the profits from equations (5.8) and (5.9) with respect
to the levels of the supply shock ε∗ for both production modes. In case of
vertical FDI, a negative supply shock is more harmful to the profits than the
benefits from a positive shock. On the other hand, a negative supply shock
is less harmful to the profits in the horizontal case than the benefits from a
positive shock. The reason for this is that the profits of a vertical production
might be concave with respect to ε∗ whereas the profits from horizontal FDI
potentially are convex. Aizenman and Marion [2004] try to proof that
∂2E(Πv)
∂ε∗2
< 0
and
∂2E(Πh)
∂ε∗2
> 0.
4See Appendix for a detailed derivation of the expected profits for both types.
5See Appendix.
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Figure 5.1: Impact of Productivity Shocks on Profits
Note: Simulation results for θ = θ∗ = 0.5 and η = 4. Profits are normalized to
one for both cases in the absence of a shock.
However, their proof contains some mistakes. For plausible, not too
extreme values of θ∗v and η we find that under vertical production E(Πv)
actually is concave with respect to ε∗. Thus, as stated before, it is likely
that high uncertainty lowers profits from vertical fragmentation. In case
that production is organized horizontal, there exists a wide range of values
for θ∗h and η where E(Πh) will never or not necessarily be convex.
6 Hence,
uncertainty could have a positive impact or even a negative one, which is less
likely but still possible.
6See Appendix for a derivation and a discussion.
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Intuitively, the reason for these results is the following: Under vertical
production the multinational monopolist has to ensure a certain proportion
between the labor employed in the parent firm and the amount of interme-
diate goods from the foreign affiliate. A positive supply shock induces that
less labor will be employed in the foreign plant, which becomes more pro-
ductive. On the other hand, a negative shock would increase the amount of
labor in order to hold the intermediate production constant. As labor has
decreasing marginal productivity, the necessary increase in foreign labor due
to a negative shock is larger than the decrease of labor induced by a positive
shock. Hence, supply uncertainty increases costs and reduces the expected
profits from vertical FDI. In the case of horizontal FDI, substitutability be-
tween both plants ensures that total marginal costs of production are equal.
A positive supply shock shifts employment towards the foreign affiliate. A
negative shock can be partly compensated by shifting employment towards
the parent firm. Both effects might compensate each other or even a positive
effect might remain.
Consequently, it is likely that more volatile production shocks reduce
the profits of a multinational enterprise engaged in a vertical FDI. On the
contrary, profits which are related to horizontal FDI might increase if uncer-
tainty is high.
The first derivatives of the profit functions with respect to productivities
and wages reveal that
∂Πv
∂b
> 0,
∂Πv
∂b∗
> 0,
∂Πv
∂w∗
< 0,
∂Πh
∂a
> 0,
∂Πh
∂a∗
> 0,
∂Πh
∂w∗
< 0.7
Thus, as intuitively expected, higher productivity in the parent firm as well as
in the foreign affiliate increases profits for horizontal and vertical production,
whereas higher wages in the foreign affiliate reduce profits.
7See Appendix for a detailed analysis. The shocks do not affect the sign of the deriva-
tives.
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It is less difficult to derive the impact of demand shocks on expected
profits of a multinational enterprise in the case of vertical and horizontal
production.8 In the absence of a supply shock and for the case of a demand
shock, we modify the demand function equation (5.7) to be
Y d = [
A
PY
]η; η =
1
1− δ
> 1
with
A =
{
A0 for the home country
(1 + ν∗)1/ηA0 for the foreign country
ν∗ is a mean zero demand shock. It can be shown that a higher volatility of
this shock reduces the expected profits for both vertical and horizontal FDI
as profits are concave with respect to demand shocks
∂2E(Πv)
∂ν∗2
< 0 and
∂2E(Πh)
∂ν∗2
< 0.9
To summarize the results, demand uncertainty has a negative influence
on expected profits for both modes, whereas supply uncertainty most likely
has a negative impact on vertical but potentially positive impact on profits
from horizontal FDI.
In the next section, we will empirically test the predictions from the
model.
8Aizenman and Marion [2004] also analyze sovereign risks. In this case, profits are
less effected in the case of an horizontal FDI as the bargaining power of a multinational
enterprise against the foreign government is higher due to the higher substitutability of
production between home and foreign. We will not consider sovereign risks here. As shown
in Chapter 2, they do not play an important role for Austrian and German investors.
9See Appendix.
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5.3 Empirical Analysis
Aizenman and Marion [2004] empirically test the impact of uncertainty on
profits of horizontal and vertical FDI. They use data on the sales of majority
owned foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals which is provided by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The authors measure profits from vertical
FDI as total exports of all U.S. affiliates from the host country, assuming
that these exports represent intermediate goods used for further production
in the U.S. or any third country. Profits from horizontal FDI are measured
by the sum of all affiliate sales in the host market considered. The assump-
tion here is that these local sales are final goods. The cross-country data
they use cover 42 countries for the years 1989 and 1994. Dependent vari-
ables are aggregated exports and local sales of U.S. affiliates located in a
particular country. The explanatory variables are risk measures and other
control variables like real GDP of the host country, distance from the USA,
the tax rate and a dummy variable for an English speaking country. They
find out that supply-side uncertainty which is measured by the volatility of
GDP per worker negatively affects the export volume of U.S. multinational
affiliates in a particular country but the effect on local sales is smaller and
not significant. This indicates that supply risks are harmful for the profits
of vertical FDI but not for horizontal FDI. The volatility in terms of trade
as a measure of demand-side uncertainty and the sovereign risk index show
a negative and significant impact on the exports as well as on local sales.
Although the data confirm the theoretic findings, they also show some
essential shortcomings. First, the theory suggests that uncertainty has an im-
pact on the profits of the multinational enterprise. However, the aggregated
exports or local sales of U.S. affiliates within one country might rather be an
approximation to the profits of the foreign affiliates. Secondly, the theory
suggests that firm-level characteristics like the productivity and the wages
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of the plants play an crucial role for explaining the profits of multinational
enterprises.
The purpose of the following analysis is to test the empirical implica-
tions of the model discussed with firm-level data from German foreign direct
investments into CEEC and the CIS. The advantage of the use of disaggre-
gated data is that we are able to test the implications of uncertainty on the
profits of horizontal and vertical organized multinational enterprises and not
only those of the foreign affiliates. Moreover, in contrast to the empirical
analysis of Aizenman and Marion, we are able to find appropriate measures
of the variables derived from the theory. Furthermore, we can explore the
role of uncertainty on the decision of a multinational enterprise whether to
undertake a horizontal or a vertical FDI project. The next section describes
the estimation function for the profits and the data for the empirical analysis.
5.3.1 The Data and Estimation Equation
It is not possible to make a clear-cut differentiation between vertical and
horizontal FDI. The reason is that some FDI projects might be motivated by
cost-reducing and market searching strategies simultaneously. The empirical
literature separates vertical from horizontal FDI in different ways.
One strand claims that vertical FDI have strong input-output-relationships
between the multinational enterprise and the foreign affiliate, for instance
Braconier and Ekholm [2001], Braconier et al. [2002] for firm-level Data and
Aizenman and Marion [2004] for cross-country data. According to Lankes
and Venables [1997] horizontal FDI are assumed to be market searching.
Consequently, a second distinction between both types of FDI can be made
by observing horizontal FDI if the complete production of the foreign af-
filiate is sold at the host market. Finally, Protsenko [2003] combines both
approaches and defines a vertical FDI being in place if the foreign affiliate
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exports more than 50 percent of its output. Otherwise a horizontal FDI had
been established.
The last definition seems to be adequate for our purposes: The theory
defines horizontal FDI if the entire production is located in each of both
countries. As no transportation costs are assumed, the foreign affiliate might
export (a part of) its production to other markets. Hence, the second defini-
tion seem to be too narrow, whereas the last one is flexible enough to account
for this possibility.
The firm data is drawn from the firm survey ”German and Austrian FDI
in CEEC” by the University of Munich.10 We only consider German FDI
and do not include Austrian FDI projects. The reason is that only 13.7%
of Austrian projects are vertical FDI according to the definition we made,
whereas this is the case for about 27% of German projects. The data are
devided in two subsamples for horizontal and vertical FDI projects. Similar
to the analysis of Aizenman and Marion, demand-side uncertainty is captured
by exrunc which is a measure for exchange rate risks. Contrary to them,
we choose euromon as a measure for supply-side risks. Their risk measure
for supply risk (volatility of GDP per worker) could also be a measure for
demand risks to some extent. On the other hand, the composite country risk
index from the magazine Euromoney captures a wider range of risks which
are important for institutional investors like political risks, debt indicators
or access to capitial markets. Both risk indices already had been used in the
previous chapters.11
From equations (5.8) and (5.9) we separately estimate the following
equation for the profits of a multinational in case of a horizontal FDI and a
10See Section 1.2.
11See Chapter 2 for more detailed information.
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vertical FDI
msales = β0 + β1 euromon + β2 exrunc + β3 pproduct + β4 aproduct
+ β5 awage + β6 memploy + µ
(5.10)
where msales is the logarithm of worldwide sales of the multinational enter-
prise, uncertainty is captured by euromon or exrunc. pproduct and aproduct
are the productivity of the parent firms and the foreign affiliates respectively.
The productivity of the investor and the affiliate is measured as sales per
worker. awage is the wage in the foreign affiliate. In order to account for
level effects we additionally include the logarithm of worldwide employment
of the multinational memploy.
5.3.2 Estimation Results
The results from OLS estimations are presented in Table 5.1. The estimation
results of the profits of multinational enterprises engaged in vertical FDI are
shown in the first three columns and for the cases of horizontal FDI in the
last three columns.
As expected, the worldwide sales of the multinational enterprise as a
measure for its profits is mostly explained by worldwide employees. We
included the logarithm of employees in order to control for level effects. The
wage of the foreign affiliate awage has no impact on profits from vertical FDI
and a negative impact on the profits associated with horizontal FDI, although
not significant at conventional levels. As predicted, the productivity of the
foreign affiliate aproduct has a positive impact on worldwide sales, whereas
for the parent firms productivity this is only the case for multinationals which
are organized horizontally.
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Now we turn on the effect of uncertainty. As the theoretical findings pre-
dict, the coefficients of the measures for productivity uncertainty (euromon)
and demand uncertainty (exrunc) both are negative and significant in the
case of vertical FDI in columns (1) and (2). euromon looses its explanatory
power if both risk measures are included, but exrunc still remains significant
(column (3)). For horizontal FDI, the model predicts that the coefficient of
demand uncertainty exrunc should be always negative, whereas the coeffi-
cient of productivity uncertainty should rather be positive or show no impact
than being negative. The empirical results support this hypotheses: Higher
demand risk exrunc lowers the profits of a multinational enterprise. The
coefficient in column (5) is negative and significant, also if euromon is in-
cluded in column (6). Higher supply risks measured by euromon do not effect
the profits in column (4) and its coefficient is positive but not significant at
conventional levels if both risks measures are considered (column (6)). This
supports the predictions derived from the theory.
To summarize the empirical results, the data from German FDI into
CEEC and the CIS confirm the model which predicts that demand risks
decrease expected profits of a multinational enterprise in both types vertical
and horizontal FDI. In the other hand, supply risks significantly decrease
profits from vertical FDI, but they have no or even a positive impact in the
case of horizontal FDI.
These findings should have a notable influence on the decision of an
investor whether he should enter the foreign market by fragmenting the pro-
duction process vertically or whether he should prefer horizontal FDI. We
will empirically address this question in the next section.
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5.3.3 Empirical Investigation of the Decision between
both Production Modes
As an implication from the model, from an ex-ante point of view a multi-
national enterprise should avoid vertical FDI if supply risks are high. The
reason is that these have a negative impact on expected profits from vertical
FDI, whereas there is no impact of supply risks on profits from horizontal
FDI, or even a positive one. Hence, high supply risks should make vertical
FDI less likely. On the other hand, demand risks should not influence the
decision of an investor. It has been shown that demand risks affect profits
from both types of FDI negatively. Therefore, they might prevent the in-
vestor from investing at all, but they should not have any impact on the
choice between both types.
From the literature we find further variables which have an influence
on the decision of a multinational enterprise between vertical and horizontal
FDI. As vertical FDI are driven by relative factor prices between countries
(Helpman [1984], Helpman and Krugman [1985], Markusen [1995], Hanson
et al. [2003]), higher wages should make vertical FDI less likely. Thus, high
wages in the foreign affiliate awage as a measure for the wage level in the
host economy should prevent the multinational from vertical FDI.
A larger distance between the home country of the parent firm and the
host country increases transportation costs. In order to avoid these costs, the
investor will set up the whole production process abroad (Brainard [1993]).
This increases the probability to undertake a horizontal FDI and hence makes
vertical FDI less likely. The logarithm of the distance between the parent
firm and the foreign affiliate ldistanc is taken as a measure for transportation
costs. Additionally, a larger market size offers greater opportunities to realize
economies of scale which makes horizontal FDI more likely and lowers the
probability for vertical FDI. The market size is measured by the logarithm
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of the total population lpop.
The results from bivariate probit estimations are presented in Table
5.2. The dependent variable is vertical which is one if the multinational
enterprise has undertaken a vertical FDI and zero in case of a horizontal
FDI. As before, we define a vertical FDI if the foreign affiliate exports at
least 50% of its production.
The first specification only includes those variables which have been
found to be influential in the earlier literature. All coefficients have the ex-
pected negative signs and are significant at high levels: Multinationals do
enter larger markets (lpop) less likely via vertical FDI and more likely by
undertaking a horizontal investment. Higher wages also decrease the proba-
bility for vertical FDI which underlines the argument that cost reducing is the
typical motivation for vertical FDI. The distance between the foreign affiliate
and the parent firm has a negative influence on the probability for vertical
FDI. Intermediate goods from vertical production in the foreign country are
exported to the parent firm. Larger distances and higher transportation costs
therefore lower the probability of vertical FDI.
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The empirical analysis confirms the typical forces for vertical and hor-
izontal FDI which have been discussed in the literature. We now observe
an additional force which has not been discussed so far. Column (2) shows
that higher supply risks (euromon) significantly decrease the probability for
vertical FDI. This is because the impact of supply risks on the profits from
vertical and horizontal FDI are completely opposite: Negative for the profits
from vertical and potentially positive for those from horizontal FDI. This
makes vertical FDI less likely in presence of supply risks. However, including
euromon reduces the significance of lpop and ldistanc. We also expect that
demand uncertainty exrunc has no impact on the probability of vertical FDI
as it negatively affects profits from both types. Column (3) supports this
point of view.
Finally, if we control for both uncertainty measures, larger supply side
risks (euromon) still reduce the probability of vertical FDI. The coefficient
shows a high significance. Surprisingly, higher demand uncertainty now in-
creases the probability of vertical FDI. As we have seen in the previous
section, exrunc negatively affects the expected profits from both production
modes. Hence, the positive sign of the coefficient in the decision estimation
could indicate that the investor expects that demand uncertainty is more
harmful on the profits with horizontal FDI than on those from vertical FDI.
All in all, the behaviour of the multinational investors corresponds with
the predictions of the theoretical model. As different sources of uncertainty
affect the profits from vertical and horizontal production in a different way,
they also have an impact on the investors decision between both production
modes.
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5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we explored the impact of demand and supply uncertainty on
vertical and horizontal FDI. The theoretical framework suggests that higher
supply risks should decrease the profits of a multinational enterprise when
production is fragmented vertically in different countries. In case of hori-
zontal FDI supply uncertainty has no or the opposite effect. Additionally,
greater demand risks adversely affects expected income under both produc-
tion modes.
The empirical analysis contributes to the literature in two ways. First,
firm level data enable us to find appropriate measures for the factors derived
from the model. Using data from German direct investments into Eastern
Europe supports the result that higher demand and supply risks significantly
reduce the incomes from vertical FDI. Only higher demand risks significantly
reduce profits from horizontal FDI, whereas higher supply risks show no
impact or even have a positive impact. The second contribution is that the
decision of a multinational enterprise between both production modes also
has been examined. We have shown that well known forces like the foreign
market size, the distance between the parent firm and the foreign affiliate,
and the factor prices explain the decision between horizontal and vertical
FDI. Additionally, higher supply risks turn out to have a significant negative
impact on the probability to set up a vertical FDI. This effect has not been
considered in the literature so far.
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5.5 Appendix
1. Derivation of equation (5.6)
Minimizing total labor costs in case of horizontal FDI for a given total
output yields the Langrangian function
Ψ = LY + w
∗L∗Y − λ[a
√
LY + (1 + ε
∗)a∗
√
L∗Y − Y ] (5.11)
which leads to the following first order conditions
∂Ψ
∂LY
= 1− λ0.5aL−0.5Y = 0 (5.12)
∂Ψ
∂L∗Y
= w∗ − λ(1 + ε∗)a∗0.5aL∗−0.5Y = 0 (5.13)
∂Ψ
∂λ
= a
√
LY + (1 + ε
∗)a∗
√
L∗Y − Y = 0 (5.14)
Equation (5.6) follows from equations (5.12) and (5.13).
2. Derivation demand for Y (equation (5.7))
Maximizing the utility (5.1) given total income I = Y PY + Z gives the
Langrangian function
Ψ = Z +
A
δ
Y δ − λ[Y PY + Z − I] (5.15)
and the following first order conditions
∂Ψ
∂Y
= AY δ−1 − λPY = 0 (5.16)
∂Ψ
∂Z
= 1− λ = 0 (5.17)
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∂Ψ
∂λ
= Y PY + Z − I = 0 (5.18)
The demand function (5.7) follows from equations (5.16) and (5.17).
Alternatively, the inverse demand can be obtained
PY = AY
δ−1 (5.19)
3. Derivation of the expected profits for vertical FDI (equation
(5.8))
From (5.2) and (5.3) we calculate LY and L
∗
M
LY =
(
Y
b
)2
(5.20)
L∗M =
(
Y
(1 + ε∗)b∗
)2
(5.21)
Insert LY and L
∗
M and (5.19) into monopolist profit function
Πv = 2Y
dPY − LY − w∗L∗M − Cv (5.22)
yields
Πv = 2AY
δ − 2Y 2
{
b−2 + w∗[(1 + ε∗)b∗]−2
}
− Cv. (5.23)
The monopolist optimal output can be calculated
∂Πv
∂Y
= 2δAY δ−1 − 4Y
{
b−2 + w∗[(1 + ε∗)b∗]−2
}
(5.24)
=⇒ Ỹ =
[
0.5δA
{b−2 + w∗[(1 + ε∗)b∗]−2}
] 1
2−δ
(5.25)
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4. Derivation of the expected profits for horizontal FDI (equation
(5.9))
The monopolist profit function is
Πh = 2
[
a
√
LY + (1 + ε
∗)a∗
√
L∗Y
2
]δ
− LY − w∗L∗Y − Ch (5.32)
After inserting L∗Y = LY
[a∗(1+ε∗)/w∗]2
a2
from equation (5.6) we find
Πh = 2
1−δAL0.5δY
[
a +
[(1 + ε∗)a∗]2
w∗a
]δ
− LY
[
1 +
[(1 + ε∗)a∗]2
w∗a2
]
− Ch (5.33)
The optimal labor employed in the home country can be calculated
∂Πh
∂LY
= 21−δA0.5δL0.5δ−1Y
[
a +
[(1 + ε∗)a∗]2
w∗a
]δ
−
[
1 +
[(1 + ε∗)a∗]2
w∗a2
]
= 0
(5.34)
L̃Y = (2
−δAδ)
2
2−δ

[
a + [(1+ε
∗)a∗]2
w∗a
]δ[
1 + [(1+ε
∗)a∗]2
w∗a2
]

2
2−δ
= (2−δAδ)
2
2−δ
[
a2 +
[(1 + ε∗)a∗]2
w∗
]− 2(1−δ)
2−δ
a
2(2−δ)
2−δ
(5.35)
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5. The 1. and 2. derivative of the profit function from vertical
FDI with respect to ε∗
The profit function is
Πv = kv[θv + θ
∗
v(1 + ε
∗)−2]−
η−1
η+1 − Cv
The first derivative with respect to ε∗ is
∂Πv
∂ε∗
= (−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
)
kv
[
θv + θ
∗
v(1 + ε
∗)−2
]− η−1
η+1
−1
θ∗v(1+ε
∗)−3 > 0 (5.40)
The second derivative than is
∂2Πv
∂ε∗2
= (−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
)
θ∗v
(
−η − 1
η + 1
− 1
)
kv
[
θv + θ
∗
v(1 + ε
∗)−2
]− η−1
η+1
−2
(−2)θ∗v(1 + ε∗)−3(1 + ε∗)−3
+ (−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
)
θ∗vkv
[
θv + θ
∗
v(1 + ε
∗)−2
]− η−1
η+1
−1
(−3)(1 + ε∗)−4
(5.41)
At ε∗=0 and with θv + θ
∗
v=1 we get
∂2Πv
∂ε∗2
|ε∗=0 =
(−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
)
θ∗v
(
−η − 1
η + 1
− 1
)
kv(−2)θ∗v + (−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
)
θ∗vkv(−3)
= kv(−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
)
θ∗v
[
(−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
− 1
)
θ∗v − 3
]
(5.42)
The profit function is concave with respect to ε∗ at ε∗=0 if ∂2Πv/∂ε
∗2 < 0,
hence if
(−2)
(
−η − 1
η + 1
− 1
)
θ∗v − 3 < 0 ⇐⇒ θ∗v <
3
4
(η + 1)
η
. (5.43)
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Note that θ∗v ∈]0; 1[. As η > 1, the right hand side of the inequality ranges
between 0.75 (η →∞) and 1.5 (η → 1). Hence, only extremely high levels
of η and θ∗v could make it possible that Πv would be convex. For instance, if
η = 10 than θ∗v has to be smaller than 0.825 to ensure concavity. Hence, for
plausible values of η and θ∗v Πv is concave.
6. The 1. and 2. derivative of the profit function from hori-
zontal FDI with respect to ε∗
The profit function is
Πh = kh[θh + θ
∗
h(1 + ε
∗)2]
η−1
η+1 − Ch
The first derivative with respect to ε∗ is
∂Πh
∂ε∗
= 2
(
η − 1
η + 1
)
kh
[
θh + θ
∗
h(1 + ε
∗)2
] η−1
η+1
−1
θ∗h(1 + ε
∗) > 0 (5.44)
For the second derivative at ε∗=0 and with θv + θ
∗
v=1 we get
∂2Πh
∂ε∗2
|ε∗=0 = kh2
(
η − 1
η + 1
)
θ∗h
[
2
(
η − 1
η + 1
− 1
)
θ∗h + 1
]
(5.45)
The profit function is convex with respect to ε∗ at ε∗=0 if ∂2Πh/∂ε
∗2 > 0,
hence if
2
(
η − 1
η + 1
− 1
)
θ∗h + 1 > 0 ⇐⇒ θ∗v <
1
4
(η + 1). (5.46)
For θ∗h ∈]0; 1[ and as the right hand side of the inequality ranges between
0.5 (η → 1) and ∞ (η →∞), this is not necessarily true. Hence, for small
values of η and high values of θ∗v the profit function would be concave.
For instance, if η is marginal larger than 1, the critical value for θ∗h to
ensure the condition for convexity is 0.5. If η = 3 than Πh would be always
convex, as the critical value for θ∗h would be 1. As it is possible for a wider
range of combinations of η and θ∗v to fail the convexity condition, we would
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expect no impact of uncertainty on the profits of a multinational enterprise
engaging in horizontal FDI.
7. Comparative statics from the profit functions
Vertical profits
The impact of productivity in the parent firm is
∂Πv
∂b
= 2(1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
(
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
) η−1
η+1
η − 1
η + 1
[
b−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
+
w∗b∗−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
(1 + ε∗)−2
]− η−1
η+1
[
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
]−1
b−3 − (1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
(
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
) η−1
η+1
η − 1
η + 1
[
b−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
+
w∗b∗−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
(1 + ε∗)−2
]− η−1
η+1
[
− 2b
−3
(b−2 + w∗b∗−2)
+
2b−5
(b−2 + w∗b∗−2)2
+
2w∗b−3b∗−2
(b−2 + w∗b∗−2)2
(1 + ε∗)−2
]
[
b−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
+
w∗b∗−2
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
(1 + ε∗)−2
]−1
(5.47)
Rearranging terms gives
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∂Πv
∂b
= 2(1− 0.5δ)(1 + ε∗)2A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
(
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
) η−1
η+1
η − 1
η + 1
b∗2
[
b∗2(1 + ε∗)2 + w∗b2
(b∗2 + w∗b2)(1 + ε∗)2
]− η−1
η+1 [
b∗2(1 + ε∗)2 + w∗b2
]−1
b−1 > 0.
(5.48)
Similarly we yield the impact of productivity in the foreign affiliate
∂Πv
∂b∗
= 2(1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
(
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
) η−1
η+1
η − 1
η + 1
b2w∗
[
b∗2(1 + ε∗)2 + w∗b2
(b∗2 + w∗b2)(1 + ε∗)2
]− η−1
η+1 [
b∗2(1 + ε∗)2 + w∗b2
]−1
b∗−1 > 0.
(5.49)
The impact of wages in the foreign affiliate is
∂Πv
∂w∗
= (−1)(1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
(
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
) η−1
η+1
η − 1
η + 1
b2
[
b∗2(1 + ε∗)2 + w∗b2
(b∗2 + w∗b2)(1 + ε∗)2
]− η−1
η+1 [
b∗2(1 + ε∗)2 + w∗b2
]−1
< 0.
(5.50)
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Horizontal profits
∂Πh
∂a
= 2(1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)−1
η − 1
η + 1
a
[
a2w∗
a2w∗ + a∗2
+
a∗2
a2w∗ + a∗2
(1 + ε∗)2
] η−1
η+1
+
+ (1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1
[
a2w∗
a2w∗ + a∗2
+
a∗2
a2w∗ + a∗2
(1 + ε∗)2
] η−1
η+1
−1
η − 1
η + 1
[
2aw∗
(a2w∗ + a∗2)
− 2a
3w∗2
(a2w∗ + a∗2)2
− 2a
∗2aw∗
(a2w∗ + a∗2)2
(1 + ε∗)2
]
(5.51)
Collecting terms yields
∂Πh
∂a
= 2(1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1 η − 1
η + 1
aw∗
[
a2w∗
a2w∗ + a∗2
+
a∗2
a2w∗ + a∗2
(1 + ε∗)2
] η−1
η+1 [
a2w∗ + a∗2(1 + ε∗)2
]−1
> 0.
(5.52)
The impact of the productivity in the foreign affiliate on the profits of the
MNE is
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∂Πh
∂a∗
= 2(1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1 η − 1
η + 1
a∗(1 + ε∗)2
[
a2w∗
a2w∗ + a∗2
+
a∗2
a2w∗ + a∗2
(1 + ε∗)2
] η−1
η+1 [
a2w∗ + a∗2(1 + ε∗)2
]−1
> 0.
(5.53)
The impact of the wage in the foreign affiliate on the profits of the MNE is
∂Πh
∂w∗
= (−1)(1− 0.5δ)A
2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1 η − 1
η + 1
a∗2(1 + ε∗)2
[
a2w∗
a2w∗ + a∗2
+
a∗2
a2w∗ + a∗2
(1 + ε∗)2
] η−1
η+1 [
a2w∗ + a∗2(1 + ε∗)2
]−1
w∗−1 < 0.
(5.54)
8. The impact of demand shocks on expected profits
In the case of demand shocks we assume a demand for each country
Y d = [
A
PY
]η; η =
1
1− δ
> 1
with
A =
{
A0 for the home country
(1 + ν∗)1/ηA0 for the foreign country
Thus, total demand is
2Y d = Y df + Y
d
h =
[
A0
PY
]η
+
[
(1 + ν∗)1/ηA0
PY
]η
which is
2Y d = 2
[
A
PY
]η
= 2
[
A0
PY
]η
(1 + 0.5ν∗)
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thus
A = A0(1 + 0.5ν
∗)1/η
Hence, the profit functions (5.33) and (5.39) with ε∗=0 but with demand
shocks are
Πv = (1− 0.5δ)
[
A0(1 + 0.5ν
∗)1/η
] 2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
] η−1
η+1
− Cv
and
Πh = (1− 0.5δ)
[
A0(1 + 0.5ν
∗)1/η
] 2η
η+1 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1
− Ch
Simplifying yields
Πv = Xv(1 + 0.5ν
∗)2/1+η − Cv
and
Πh = Xh(1 + 0.5ν
∗)2/1+η − Ch
with
Xv = (1−0.5δ)A
2η
η+1
0 2
2
η+1
[
δ
b−2 + w∗b∗−2
] η−1
η+1
, Xh = (1−0.5δ)A
2η
η+1
0 2
2
η+1
[
δ
(
a2 +
a∗2
w∗
)] η−1
η+1
The first and second derivative of Πv is
∂Πv
∂ν∗
= 0.5
2
η + 1
Xv(1 + 0.5ν
∗)
2
η+1
−1 > 0
∂2Πv
∂ν∗2
= 0.25
2
η + 1
[
2
η + 1
− 1
]
Xv(1 + 0.5ν
∗)
2
η+1
−2 < 0 as η > 1
Accordingly it holds that ∂Πh
∂ν∗
> 0 and ∂
2Πh
∂ν∗2
< 0.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
The world economy experienced a rapid increase in foreign direct invest-
ments during the last two decades, especially between developed countries.
After the fall of the iron curtain, FDI inflows into Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States have also
grown dramatically during the 1990s. The transition of the former planned
economies into market economies is accompanied by economic, political and
social changes, which are responsible for different types of risks.
The aim of this thesis has been to analyze the impact of uncertainty
and country risks on various decisions of a multinational enterprise, which
undertakes a direct investment abroad. We examined different models and
then tested them empirically. In the first step, in Chapter 2 we recalled
different country risk measures and developed a measure for exchange rate
risk. Data from a firm survey indicates that decision makers of multinational
enterprises regarded this type of country risk to be most important.
In Chapter 3 we explored the investors decision about the mode of en-
try. Previous theoretical and empirical literature has shown that the choice
between greenfield investment and acquisition is driven by the technological
advantage of the investor. If it is large, buying and restructuring an existing
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firm in an developing country such as CEEC could be too expensive. On the
other hand, an existing firm could have some valuable experience in business
within a country. Hence, if country risks are high, these risks might be less
costly in case of an acquisition than in case of a greenfield investment. The
trade-off between the costs of restructuring and the costs of uncertainty im-
plies that for high levels of both, the investor will never invest. For moderate
levels he will prefer greenfield investment if country risk is low and if the tech-
nological advantage is high. To test this implications empirically, we used
a probit application of the Heckman sample selection model which accounts
for the possibility that a multinational enterprise decided not to invest at all.
Contrary to the huge amount of empirical studies, for the case of investments
in Eastern Europe, technological intensive investors less likely enter a foreign
market via greenfield investment. As predicted, we find strong evidence that
higher country risks reduce the probability for this entry mode.
Chapter 4 raises the question when to enter a foreign market. A real
option approach suggests that, among other factors, investment will occur
later if uncertainty is high. The reason is that in this case the option to
invest becomes highly valuable and the investor desires a higher present value
from the FDI project. Thus, the investor postpones the investment. The
empirical investigation confirms this theoretical result. By applying a Cox
Proportional Hazard Model we find, among other factors, that higher country
risks decrease the likelihood for early investment.
Finally, Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of demand and supply uncer-
tainty on the profits of a multinational enterprise in the case of horizon-
tal and vertical FDI separately. Both production modes suffer from higher
demand uncertainty. However, higher supply uncertainty reduces the ex-
pected income associated with vertical FDI but potentially increases those
from horizontal FDI. The empirical analysis with firm level data supports
both predictions. Furthermore, this result implies a clear statement about
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the decision of a multinational enterprise whether to undertake a vertical
or a horizontal FDI: Higher supply uncertainty should make vertical FDI
less likely, whereas demand uncertainty should show no impact. A bivariate
estimation procedure empirically supports these predictions.
To sum up, the thesis shows that country risks play an important role
for the FDI decisions of multinational enterprises. The question whether an
investment abroad occurs if uncertainty is present already had been discussed
in the previous literature. More attention should be paid to the impact of
country risk on other decisions, for instance those examined in this thesis -
the entry mode, the timing and the production mode decision.
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